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The traditional requirement of Anglo-Canadian law, that issue estoppel applies
only as betwen those who were parties to both the earlier andsubsequent litigation,
is fast disappearing. However, the disappearance of this requirement of mutuality
is presently confused by the courts' invocation of the rubric of `abuse ofprocess';
rather than a straight abandonment of the requirement of mutuality. This article
describes the abandonment of mutuality in American law and the emergence of
the doctrine of non-mutual issue estoppel, and critically examines the movements
in Canadian and English law in the same direction. While advocating that Anglo-
Canadian courts openly adopt non-mutual issue estoppel, the author putsforward
a number of proposals designed to make the handling of duplicative litigation
both fairer and more efficient.
La nécessité traditionnelle, en droit anglo-canadien, de nappliquer la fin de non-
recevoir qu'à ceux qui étaient parties au litige à la fois dans la première action
et dans les actions suivantes, tombe rapidement en désuétude. Mais la disparition
de cette règle de la nécessité d'avoir les mêmes parties n'est pas claire parce que
les tribunaux invoquent l'abus de procédures, au lieu d'abandonner franchement
la règle de la nécessité. L'auteur de cet article décrit l'abandon de la nécessité
d'avoir les mêmes parties en droit américain et l'apparition de la doctrine de la
fin de non-recevoir sans que les parties soient les mêmes; il examine de façon
critique le développement, dans la même direction du droit canadien et anglais.
* Garry D. Watson, of Osgoode Hall Law school of York University, Toronto, Ontario.
Thanks to Bill Bogart, Harry Glasbeek, Peter Hogg, Allan Hutchinson, John McCamus,
Hiroshi Motomura, Paul Perell, Jack Ratliff, Kent Roach, Tom Rowe, Judith Resnik,
Robert Sharpe, David Vaver and Tim Youdan for their helpful comments and to Lisa
Henderson, Peter Henderson, Kirk Stevens and Barbara Walsh for their assistance.
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Tout en recommandant aux tribunaux anglo-canadiens l'adoption sans équivoque
de la fin de non-recevoir sans que les parties soient les mêmes, l'auteur fait un
certain nombre de suggestions ayant pour but de rendreplusjuste et plus efficace
le traitement d'actions à répétition.
The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact,
and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean
by the law.'
Introduction
When may a non-party to a proceeding rely upon findings made in that
proceeding in a later action? Never, says the traditional Canadian and
English doctrine, because issue estoppel is limited to thosewho were parties
to the earlier litigation, or their privies. To do otherwise would offend
the concept of "mutuality", that a party may only take the benefit of
a prior decision if it would also have been bound had the decision gone
the other way. But if this is the law, how do we explain the fact that
in twenty-nine out ofthirty-one reported decisions on this question in Canada
and England since the mid-1970s some form of preclusive effect' has been
given to a previous decision in favour of a person who was not a party
to the original proceeding? The Americans have a simple answer: mutuality
is dead. It is no longer a requirement and issue estoppel may be asserted
by non-parties (to the original litigation) in subsequent litigation, provided
the party against whom it is sought to plead the estoppel was a party
to the prior litigation and had a full and fair opportunity to defend . In
so holding the American courts have unabashedly pronounced the death
of mutuality. By contrast, Canadian (and to a lesser extent English) courts,
while clinging to the notion that issue estoppel still requires mutuality,
have in fact killed it . This certainly seems to be so if we accept Holmes'
edict that the law is what the court will do in fact3 The process of burying
mutuality is a painful one, the resulting doctrine is confused, and in the
process, the Canadian and English courts have often failed to adopt important
I O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law (1897), 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, at p. 461.
z "Some form of preclusive effect" is used here, descriptively, to include those cases
where the courts have permitted prior judgments to be used as "prima facie evidence
subject to rebuttal"; see infra, the text at footnotes 74, 81 . (If these cases are excluded,
the figure is 18 rather than 29). The two cases denying preclusive effect in favour of
a non-party are Gleeson v. J. Wippell & Co. Ltd, [1977] 1 W.L.R. 510, (1977] 3 All
E.R. 54 (Ch. D.), (discussed infra, the text at footnote 54), and Beaulieu v. McLaughlin
(1986), 68 N.B.R. (2d) 444 (N.B.C .A .) (discussed infra, in footnote 81). I have excluded
from this calculation cases denying preclusion in circumstances where an American court
would have refused to apply non-mutual issue estoppel, for example Bragg v. Oceanus
Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd, [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 132 (C.A .),
(discussed infra, the text at footnote 67), and the cases referred to in footnote 74.
3 Supra, footnote 1 . Holmes' insight has become trite learning but is still honoured




qualifications recognized by the American courts as part and parcel of
the general doctrine of non-mutual issue estoppel .
This article first describes hoax and why the Americans abandoned
mutuality . It then traces the steps taken by the Canadian andEnglish courts
in the same direction, and examines the current status of the doctrine in
the United States . I will argue that the American approach is rational
and essentially sound in policy terms and should be followed by Canadian
courts . However, the doctrine is not free of difficulty, as the Americans
have discerned . In the final part of this article, I suggest directions in which
the law might be developed to alleviate these difhculties.4
In part this is a review article which draws heavily on the writings
of others. However, I believe the subject matter is worthy of extensive
analysis in the Anglo-Canadian context. It is complex and important, the
literature is vast,s the parameters of the problem and possible solutions
often seem poorly understood by the Commonwealth judiciary and few
Commonwealth academics seem to know about the doctrineor the literature .
oreover, the abandonment of mutuality is still much debated in the
merican literature and the promise it held has not been fulfilled in the
United States as a solution to the problems of repetitive litigation .
4 See infra, Part VI.
s In the United States there may well be more than 100 articles and notes on the
subject. The early important literature includes: E.W. Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined
(1947-48), 57 Yale L.J . 339; G.C. Hazard, Res Nova in Res Judicata (1970-71), 44 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 1036; B. Currie, Civil Procedure-The Tempest Brews (1965), 53 Cal. L.
Rev. 25 ; B. Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel-Limits of the Bernhard doctrine
(1956-57), 9 Stan . L. Rev. 281; J.W. Moore and T.S. Currier, Mutuality and the
Conclusiveness ofJudgments (1960-61),35 Tul. L. Rev. 301; H. Semmel, Collateral Estoppel,
Mutuality and Joinder of Parties (1968), 68 Col. L. Rev. 1457; A.D . Vestal, Preclusion/
Res Judicata Variables : Parties (1964-65), 50 Iowa L. Rev. 27. More recent periodical
writings are referred to throughout this article. For American textbook treatment of this
subject see, C.A. Wright, A.R. Miller and E.H . Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure,
para . 4463 (1981); J.H. Friedenthal, M.K. Kane and A.R . Miller, Civil Procedure, para.
14.9 (1985) ; C.A . Wright, The Law of Federal Courts, para . 72 (4th ed ., 1983); F. James,
Jr. and G.C. Hazard, Civil Procedure, para. 11.24 (3d ed., 1985). For a statement of
the modern American law see, Restatement (2nd), Judgments, para . 29 (1982).
The Canadian literature is much more modest . The leading article is M.J. Herman
and G.F . Hayden, Issue Estoppel: Mutuality of Parties Reconsidered (1986), 64 Can. Bar
Rev. 437. See, also, T. Pinos, Res Judicata Redux (1988), 26 Osg. Hall L.J. 713; O.J.R.
Smith, The Legacy ofDemeter: Pleading Highway Traffic ActConvictions in Civil Negligence
Cases: Are There Any Limits? (1989), 1 C.I.L.R . 75; G.D . Watson and M. McGowan,
Annual Survey ofRecent Developments in Civil Procedure, in Ontario Supreme and District
Court Practice (1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989 editions); M.A . Gelowitz, Bomac and OHara,
Abuse and Abdication (1989), 53 Sask . L. Rev. 163; T. Youdan, Annotation (1985),
21 Estates and Trust Reports 2.
The English literature is virtually non-existent . See J.K. Bentil, Using Civil Action
to Attack Criminal Determinations (1983), 127 Solicitors J. 545; Case Comment, Civil
Action After Decision of Criminal Court (1982), 46 J. Crim . Law 82 .
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The resolution of doctrinal difficulties, of course, takes place in the
context of broader normative concerns that infuse and inform legal rules
and policy. Although I will not explore the implications of this important
understanding, it is essential to acknowledge the play and pull of competing
visions of procedural justice.6 In short, this article aligns itself with the
more expansive "public" view of litigation rather than the more traditional
"private" conception.? The conventional principle of non-mutuality draws
its normative justification from a theory of correctivejustice whoseprimary
focus is the processing of individualized disputes in line with a restricted,
individual and rights-centred ideology. On the other hand, the broader
approach advocated in this article situates itself within a vision of law
that is more sensitive to the need to ensure a more effective use of social
resources and that recognizes the public consequences of any procedural
regime . As such, this article is part of the growing trend within legal
scholarship that favours broader rules of standing, intervention, class actions
and the increased aggregation of litigation .$
1 . Issue Estoppel Defined
Res Judicata is a form of estoppel and operates through the application
oftwo doctrines or species: cause of action estoppel (called by the Americans
"claim preclusion") and issue estoppel (called by the Americans "collateral
estoppel" or "issue preclusion") . Cause of action estoppel simply means
that where the legal claims and liabilities oftwo parties have been determined
in a prior action, the claims may not be relitigated. If the cause of action
was determined to exist, it is said to be merged in the judgment. If it
was determined not to exist any subsequent action is barred.
Issue estoppel is an extension of the same rule of public policy, but
it focuses not on claims or causes of actions, but on issues. It precludes
relitigation of issues that a court has decided in a prior suit . If the cause
of action involved in a subsequent proceeding is a separate and distinct
one, cause of action estoppel will not apply. However, within a given
cause of action there may be several issues that have to be adjudicated .
If an issue has been determined in prior litigation, issue estoppel-even
if the new litigation involves a different cause of action-will prevent
relitigation of the issue already decided.9
6 For an excellent example of the integration of theoretical and practical considerations,
see D. Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A"Public Law" Vision
of the Tort System (1984), 97 Harv. L. Rev. 849.
7 See K. Roach, Teaching Procedures: The Fiss-Weinrib Debate in Practice (1990),
40 U.T.L.J . (forthcoming) .
8 See A. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation (1976), 89 Harv.
L. Rev. 1281 ; J. Resnik, From Cases to Litigation (forthcoming), and the literature cited
infra, at footnote 164.
9 The classic statement of the distinction between cause of action estoppel and issue




For issue estoppel to apply, certain requirements must be met. Three
of the four requirements for the application of issue estoppel are uncontro-
versial and generally accepted in all j4risdictions: (1) the same issue must
be involved in the initial and subsequent litigation ; (2) the issue must have
been actually litigated and determined in the first suit and its determination
must have been necessary to the result in the litigation; and (3) the decision
on the issue in question must have been final.
In the classic statements of issue estoppel in Anglo-Canadian law1o
there is a fourth requirement-the only persons who can take advantage
of the estoppel, or be boundby it, are the parties to the previous proceedings
or their privies ; no other person can take advantage of it or be bound
by it because they were notaparty to the previous proceeding . This privity
requirement is also expressed in terms of mutuality: in order for there to
be an estoppel the party must be bound by the estoppel, whichever way
it goes . If, for example, Aand p hadbeen parties to litigation that established
the authenticity ofasignature, neither can relitigate the authenticity question
in a subsequent suit between them, even in one involving a different claim
or defence . But either can litigate the question in a suit with X, who
was not a party to the first suit . Since X was not a party to the first
suit, he is not bound by the decision therein (that is, he can disavow
it if it is unfavourable to him) and consequently he cannot rely on it
if it is favourable to him. Mutuality requires that he be bound whichever
way the first case was decided. Since mutuality is lacking, X cannot bind
either A or B to the earlier judgment.II While there is a general agreement
as to the appropriateness of the first three requirements, the final require-
ment-mutuality-has been subject to considerable criticism which has
led to its abandonment in most United States jurisdictions.12
The mutuality (or "same parties") requirement-that favourable
preclusion from a former judgment is only available to persons who would
have been bound by any unfavourable preclusion-has always been
recognized as being subject to the exception for "privies" . Over the years,
and even today, courts have often manipulated the notion of privity to
permit non-parties to preclude the relitigation of issues that earlier law
suits have determined. At times the privity concept has assumed wondrous
attributes of flexibility as courts attempt to apply their subjective sense
1 All E.R. 341, at p. 352 (C.A .) . See also, Blair v. Curran (1939), 62 C.L.R. 464, at
p. 532 (H.C . of Aust.) .
10 For these requirements see, Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Raynor & Keeler Ltd (No. 2),
[19671 1 A.C. 853, at p. 935, [196612 All E.R . 536, at p. 565 (H.L.); Angle v. Minister
ofNational Revenue, [197512 S.C.R . 248, (1974), 47 D.L.R. (3d) 544; G. Spencer Bower
and A.K . Turner, The Doctrine of Res Judicata (2nd ed ., 1969), pp. 181 et seq. For
exceptions to the application of issue estoppel, see infra, footnote 123.
I1 The example is taken from J. Ratliff, Offensive Collateral Estoppel and the Option
Effect (1988), 67 Texas L. Rev. 63, at p. 70.
12 See Wright, Miller and Cooper, op. cit., footnote 5, vol. 18, para. 4464, note 3.
628
	
THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW [Vol . 69
of fairness to situations that do not fit neatly within the traditional
requirements for preclusion.13 While this technique has played an important
role in avoiding the impact of mutuality, in this article I will concentrate,
for the most part,14 on more direct assaults on the mutuality principle .
II . Setting the Scene-TheAbandonment of
Mutuality in the United States
To set the scene for a discussion of the English and Canadian case law
and an analysis of the benefits and problems associated with the abandon-
ment of mutuality, it is necessary to tell the story of the history of the
abandonment of this requirement in the United States.l s So long as issue
estoppel is confined by the mutuality/privity requirement its impact is quite
limited . However, abrogating mutuality makes it possible for a single case's
fact-finding to have a wide-ranging impact by effectively determining issues
in later cases involving only one of the original parties.
A. History of Abandonment
The abandonment of mutuality in the United States involved many
court decisions and the contribution of numerous commentators, 16 but the
story can be reduced ultimately to the contribution of two people-Jeremy
Bentham and Mr. Justice Roger Traynor-and three landmark cases .
13 See W.S . Byassee, Collateral Estoppel Without Mutuality: Accepting the Bernhard
Doctrine (1982), 35 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1423 ; Wright, Miller and Cooper, ibid. A traditional,
narrow definition of "privy" is one "who claims an interest in the subject-matter affected
by the judgment through or under one of the parties, i.e., either by inheritance, succession
or purchase; and this interest must have been acquired after rendition of the judgment":
Comment, Privity and Mutuality in the Doctrine of Res Judicata (1925-26), 35 Yale L.J .
607, at pp. 608-609. Frequently much more expansive approaches are taken to the question
of privity, even to the extent of holding that a finding of privity is no more than a finding
that all of the facts and circumstances justify a conclusion that non-party preclusion is
proper: see Byassee, ibid For a discussion of the vagueness in English law of the concept
of privity, see Gleeson v. J. Wippell & Co. Ltd, supra, footnote 2, at pp . 514 (W.L.R.),
59 (All E.R.) (discussed infra, the text at footnote 54): ". . . the word `interest' . . . seems
almost capable of meaning all things to all men; `there is a dearth of authorities in England
on the question of privies .' From such authorities as there are it is by no means easy
to distil any principle." The Restatement (2nd), Judgments (Introduction, pp . 13-14) (1981),
has abandoned the term privity and instead identifies types of non-parties who may be
bound.
14 Canadian cases applying or manipulating the privity concept are discussed, infra,
footnote 75 . There is also a brief discussion of the American experience in this regard,
infra, the text at footnote 113.
15 This is a story that has been told many times; see, for example, Herman and Hayden,
loc. cit., footnote 5; Byasee, loc. cit., footnote 13; Ratliff, loc. cit., footnote 11 ; Wright,
Miller and Cooper, op. cit., footnote 5. The account in the text draws heavily on each
o£ these sources .
16 The account given here is an oversimplification . For accounts documenting how
the United States courts struggled with the problem of mutuality, see Semmel, loc. cit,




In the nineteenth century Jeremy Bentham had called the mutuality
requirement illogical and ill-founded:17
entham referred to the rule as "a curious one, the reason given for it
still more so" and characterized it as "destitute of . . . [a] semblance of
reason" and that it was a "maxim which one would suppose to have
found its way from the gambling-table to the bench" .18 It is to be noted
that Bentham was concerned less with judicial efficiency than with what
he saw as a superfluous and illogical prerequisite to collateral estoppel .
e believed that the law entitled the litigant to only one day in court
on a given issue and that thereafter the findings should bind him and
prevent him from relitigating the same question .
There is reason for saying that a man shall not lose his cause in consequence of
the verdict given in a former proceeding to which he was not a party ; but there
is no reason whatever for saying that he shall not lose his cause in consequence
of the verdict in a proceeding to which he was a party, merely because his adversary
was not. It is right enough that the verdict obtained by A against B should not
bar the claim of a third party, C; but that it should not be evidence in favour
of C against B, seems the very height of absurdity.
The first landmark case on the abandonmentofmutuality in the United
States wasthe 1942 decision by TraynorJ. in Bernhard v. BankofAmerica.19
In action #1, P (a beneficiary) had sued D1 (the executor) with respect
to an estate and it was held that the deceased had made a gift during
her lifetime to the executor of her bank account. Subsequently, in action
#2, p (the beneficiary) sued D2 (the bank) to recover the amount in the
bank account on the ground that the deceased had never authorized the
executor to withdraw it. The court allowed the bank to invoke the first
judgment as a collateral estoppel on the issue as to the ownership of the
money, even though the bank would not have been bound had the earlier
court determined that the deceased had never given the money to her
executor . In so holding, Traynor J. explicitly rejected the requirement of
mutuality, concluding that no satisfactory rationalization had been advanced
for it. The benefits of res judicata found in "the sound policy of limiting
litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair trial on an issue
from again drawing it into controversy",2o make it "unjust to permit one
17 J. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in J. Bowring (ed.), 7 Works of Jeremy
Bentham 171 (1843). Bentham was referred to by Traynor J. in Bernhard v. Bank of
America Nat. Trust & Savings Assn ., 122 P. 2d 892, 19 Cal. 2d 807 (S.C. Cal., 1942)
(discussed infra, the text at footnote 19), and has been constantly referred to and quoted
by American courts and commentators. Lord Denning referred to him in McIlkenney v.
Chief Constable of the West Midlands, [1980] Q.B . 283, at pp . 317-318, [1980] 2 All
E.R . 227, at p. 235 (C.A .) (discussed infra, the text commencing at footnote 55), and
the above quoted passage 'appeared in the judgment of Goff L.J . in that case, ibid, at
pp. 327 (Q.B .), 243 (All E.R .) .
is Ibid.
19 Supra, footnote 17 .
20 Ibid, at p. 894 (P .) .
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who has had his day in court to reopen identical issues by merely switching
adversaries" .2I He applied a three-part test for determining when preclusion
is appropriate:22
Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented
in the action in question? Was there a final judgment on the merits? Was the party
against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with the party to the prior
adjudication?
Two points are to be noted about the Bernhard decision. First, on
its facts it sanctioned only the defensive use of non-mutual issue estoppel,
and as we will see, it is the subsequent approval of offensive non-mutual
issue estoppel which is the more powerful, and problematic, development .
Second, the abandonment of mutuality only permits the use of the estoppel
against a person who was a party to the original litigation . While it was
no longer necessary that there be the same parties to both the former
and the present action, it is essential that the person against whom the
estoppel is to be pleaded was a party to the earlier proceeding. To hold
otherwise would simply be to deny subsequent plaintiffs their day in court
and to deprive them of due process by binding them to a decision in
which they never had an opportunity to participate.23
In 1971 in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories Inc. v. University ofIllinois
Foundation,24 the United States Supreme Court joined the growing number
of state jurisdictions that had abandoned the mutuality requirement where
issue estoppel was sought to be used defensively, that is, in situations in
which a (new) defendant sought to preclude an issue that the plaintiff
had already litigated and lost against another party. The case concerned
a patent infringement action in respect of a patent that had already been
declared invalid in an earlier action brought by the plaintiff against another
party. Citing the burden on judicial administration and the misallocation
of resources resulting from relitigation of decided issues, the court followed
Bernhard and rejected the mutuality requirement . But the court imposed
the caveat that an earlier judgment could not preclude a losing party from
21 Ibid, at p. 895 (P.).
22 Ibid.
23 This is well articulated (though with the wrong result, I would submit) by Megarry
V.C., in Gleeson v. J. Wippell & Co. Ltd, supra, footnote 2 (discussed infra, the text
at footnote 54). In the United States this limitation is elevated to a constitutional requirement
by reason of the "due process clause" of the Bill of Rights: see Parklane Hosiery Co.
v. Shore, 439 U.S . 322 (1979) (discussed infra, the text at footnote 27); J.R. Pielemeier,
Due Process Limitations on the Application of Collateral Estoppel Against Non-Parties
to Prior Litigation (1983), 63 Boston U.L. Rev. 383; E.P. Schroeder, Relitigation of Common
Issues: The Failure of Non-Party Preclusion and An Alternative Proposal (1981-82), 67
Iowa L. Rev. 917. However, in the United States in recent years, attempts have been
made to extend issue estoppel to non-parties to the earlier litigation; see the two articles
just referred to and the text infra, at footnote 113. Techniques for extending "some preclusive
effect" to non-parties are discussed infra, the text at footnote 132.




relitigating an issue if he could demonstrate that the first action failed
to allow hima "fair opportunity procedurally, substantively, and evidentially
to pursue his claim"25
The defensive use of non-mutual issue estoppel is straight forward.
If P, having litigated an issue with D1 and lost, subsequently sues D2
raising the same issue, D2 can rely defensively on the issue estoppel arising
from the former action, unless the first action did not provide a full and
fair opportunity to litigate or other factors make it unfair or unwise to
permit preclusion . The rationale is that E should not be allowed to relitigate
an issue already lost by simply changing defendants, as was the case in
Blonder itself26
Like Bernhard, Blonder-Tongue approved only this defensive use of
non-mutual issue estoppel, and the court expressly refused to rule on its
offensive application. However, eight years later, the Supreme Court took
the remaining step and, in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,2 it approved
the offensive application of non-mutual issue estoppel, subject to certain
conditions . Its affirmation of this final step in the abandonment of mutuality
has been largely followed by state courts28 In Parklane, the Securities
and Exchange Commission had obtained injunctive relief against the
defendants in prior litigation on the ground that they had violated the
securities law by false and misleading proxy statements in connection with
a merger. In a subsequent private shareholders class action to recover
damages arising from the false and misleading proxy statements, the court
held that the plaintiffs could use the earlier determination to preclude the
defendants from relitigating any of the issues decided against them.
The power of this offensive non-mutual issue estoppel doctrine is
illustrated by single event disaster cases, such as an airline crash. Assume
h1 sues Airline for negligence in the operation of the aircraft and in that
action Airline is found to have been negligent. Offensive non-mutual issue
estoppel permits p2 through h20, etc., now to sue Airline and successfully
plead issue estoppel on the question of the airline's negligence . The rationale
is that if Airline fully and fairly litigated the issue of its negligence in
action #1 it has had its day in court; it has had due process and it should
not be permitted to re-litigate the negligence issue.29 However, the court
in Parklane realized that in order to ensure fairness in the operation of
offensive non-mutual issue estoppel the doctrine has to be subject to
qualifications .
27 Supra, footnote 23 .
28 Wright, Miller and Cooper, op. cit., footnote 5.
29 see, for example, United Airlines v. Weiner, 335 F. (2d) 379 (9th Cir., 1964).
2s Ibid., at p. 333.
26 This was the point that 1V[egarry V.C. failed to appreciate in Gleeson v . J. Wipple
& Co. Ltd, supra, footnote 2 (discussed infra, the text at footnote 54), which just like
Blonder was a case of the plaintiff simply changing defendants in order to relitigate the
issue.
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B. United States Requirements for the Application ofNon-Mutuality
In Parklane the court articulated two exceptions to the offensive use
of issue estoppel .
First, the court acknowledged that the effects of non-mutuality differ
depending on whether issue estoppel is used offensively or defensively.
While defensive preclusion helps to reduce litigation 30 offensive preclusion,
by contrast, encourages potential plaintiffs not to join in the first action .
"Since a plaintiff will be able to rely on a previous judgment against a
defendant but will not be bound by that judgment if the defendant wins,
the plaintiff has every incentive to adopt a `wait and see' attitude, in the
hope that the first action by another plaintiff will result in a favorable
judgment" .3 I Thus, without some limit, non-mutual offensive preclusion
would increase rather than decrease the total amount of litigation . To meet
this problem the Parklane court held that preclusion should be denied
in action #2 "where a plaintiffcould easily havejoined in the earlier action"32
Second, the court recognized that in some circumstances to permit
non-mutual preclusion "would be unfair to the defendant" and the court
referred to specific situations of unfairness: (a) the defendant may have
had little incentive to defend vigorously the first action, that is, if she
was sued for small or nominal damages, particularly if future suits were
not foreseeable; (b) offensive preclusion may be unfair if the judgment
relied upon as a basis for estoppel is itself inconsistent with one or more
previous judgments in favour of the defendant;33 or (c) the second action
affords to the defendant procedural opportunities unavailable in the first
action that could readily result in a different outcome, that is, where the
defendant in the first action was forced to defend in an inconvenient forum
and was unable to call witnesses, or where in the first action much more
limited discovery was available to the defendant than in the second action .
30 It encourages a plaintiff to join multiple defendants in one case when the claims
against them involve common issues, because she can "lose" against non-parties (since
they can make subsequent use of ajudgment that is unfavourable to the plaintiffs, invoking
Blonder-Tongue) . But the plaintiff cannot "win" against non-parties: a judgment favourable
to the plaintiff cannot be used against a non-party, because new defendants are entitled
to relitigate the question when they are sued as they will not have yet had their day
in court.
31 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, supra, footnote 23, at p. 330.
32 lbid, at p. 331 . As we will see, infra, footnote 149, United States courts have
not applied this condition of the rule strictly, with serious resulting problems.
33 Here the court specifically acknowledged Brainerd Currie's famous example (ibid,
at pp. 330-331, note 14): "[A] railroad collision injures 50 passengers all of whom bring
separate actions against the railroad . After the railroad wins the first 25 suits, a plaintiff
wins in suit 26 . Professor Currie argues that offensive use of collateral estoppel should
not be applied so as to allow plaintiffs 27 through 50 automatically to recover"; see,




In the final analysis the court declared that the general rule should
be that in cases where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier
action or where, either for the reasons discussed or for other reasons, the
application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to the defendant, a trial
judge should not allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel .34
C. Rationale for Non-Mutuality
The purpose of issue estoppel is to "relieve parties of the cost and
vexation of multiple lawsuits, conservejudicial resources, and, by preventing
inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication".35 The basic
arguments in favour of non-mutual preclusion are that it reduces the risk
of inconsistent adjudication, spares one party the cost of ever litigating
the issue, and protects the court system and other litigants against the
delay and burdens entailed by relitigati®n . These are substantial values,
which go far to support the argument that one full and fair opportunity
to litigate an issue is enough.36
ut the abandonment of mutuality, and the use of offensive non-
mutual collateral estoppel in particular, has its opponents37 and there are
policy arguments to the contrary .3 $ The first is that the case for non-mutual
preclusion is weaker than that which supports preclusion between the same
parties . The need to foster repose and reliance on judgments that support
the general doctrine of preclusion is greatly diluted in the context of non-
mutual issue preclusion. Moreover, the argument that a party should not
be "twice-vexed"-burdened with relitigating the same issues-is inappli-
cable to offensive non-mutual preclusion. The defendant in the second
action usually resists the application of issue estoppel and is quite happy
to be "twice-vexed", if this means that he or she will have a second chance
34Amore detailed and very useful list of conditions for the application of non-mutual
preclusion has been offered by the Restatement (2nd) of Judgments, op. cit., footnote 5.
However, it omits specific reference to some of the most searching inquiries that have
been suggested by some cases, and which are discussed in Wright, Cooper and Miller,
op. cit., footnote 5.
35 Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S . 90, at p. 94 (1980) .
3 6 Wright, Miller and Cooper, op. cit, footnote 5.
37 As noted by H. Motomura, Using Judgments as Evidence (1986), 70 Minn . L.
Rev. 979, at p. 1025, many commentators still have serious doubts about the wisdom
of abandoning mutuality either generally (see, E.H. Greenebaum, In Defense of the Doctrine
of Mutuality of Estoppel (1969-70), 45 Ind. L.J . 1 ; Moore and Currier, loc. cit, footnote
5; E.E. Overton, The Restatement of Judgments, Collateral Estoppel, and the Conflicts
of Laws (1976-77), 44 Ten. L. Rev. 927; Note: A Probabilistic Analysis of the Doctrine
of Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel (1977-78), 76 Mich. L. Rev. 612), or the use of offensive
non-mutual collateral estoppel in particular (see, J.F. Flanagan, OffensiveCollateral Estoppel:
Inefficiency and Foolish Consistency, [1982] Ariz . St. L.J . 45; J.F. Flanagan, The Efficiency
Hypothesis and Offensive Collateral Estoppel: A Response to Professor Callen, [1983] Ariz.
St . L.J. 835); Ratliff, loc. cit, footnote 11).
38 Wright, Miller and Cooper, op. cit, footnote 5, para . 4464, p. 582.
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at a better result . In the final analysis it is the justice system, and other
litigants within the system with urelated disputes, that benefit from non-
mutual preclusion's avoidance of duplicative litigation39
A second argument against non-mutual preclusion points to the fact
that the first determination of an issue is not always correct, and refers
to special dangers peculiar to non-mutual preclusion.¢° Experienced litigators
know that any decision may be strongly affected by the identity of the
parties. For example, a badly disfigured survivor of an accident may have
a much better chance of recovery than the estate of someone killed in
the accident. Moreover, chance may not determine the identity of the plaintiff
in the first action, since plaintiffs' lawyers may see to it that the most
sympathetic claim is tried frst.4 l This argument rejects the notion that
"fact finders compartmentalize their decision making and ignore `irrelevant'
information that one case is as good as another for establishing the liability
facts for future cases . . . . The damages proof often spills over into liability
issues so that a case weak on liability is saved if the damages are strong
and vice-versa" .42 That the first court may be ignorant of the potential
impact of its findings is seen as aggravating these difficulties . "No one
involved in the first case can be sure whether its outcome will have collateral
estoppel effects."43 The court "may yield to the temptation to make a
39 Ratliff, loc. cit, footnote 11, at p. 100.
40 While we object to relitigation, this is not because we believe in the first case
the "real truth" was found. We focus on the perception of fairness rather than on ultimate
truth or even actual fairness . (The inadequacies of an adversarial trial, particularly a jury
trial, to determine the objective truth have often been noted. See, for example, M.E. Frankel,
The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View (1974-75), 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1031, at pp .
1035-1041; J. Frank, Courts on Trial (1950), pp . 85-86, 93, 94). For the "proof of the
pudding", witness Parker J.'s attempt to avoid repetitive trials in asbestos cases by having
five differentjuries hear simultaneously the same liability evidence in five cases tried together
by the same lawyers in one courtroom, with a view to using the outcome as a basis
for non-mutual preclusion . Despite the procedural uniformity, the juries' findings were
inconsistent and "strikingly divergent" . See M.D . Green, The Inability ofOffensive Collateral
Estoppel to Fulfil Its Promise: An Examination of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation (1984-
85), 70 Iowa L. Rev. 141 . We rationalize the possibility of such divergent outcomes by
saying that, if the procedures were fair, relitigation would be unlikely to establish a more
correct outcome than did the first suit. See, Blonder-Tongue Laboratories Inc. v. University
of Illinois Foundation, supra, footnote 24, at pp. 331-332. If we were to focus exclusively
on truth-finding and the fear that action #1 may not have determined it, we would have
to abandon res judicata completely-even between the same parties. The result would
be chaos for, even under existing rules, the volume of case law indicates that there are
plenty of parties willing to attempt to relitigate. Our preference for perceived fairness over
objective truth mustbe ofconcern, however, in some situations . See, for example, Birmingham
Bombers, and the discussion, infra, the text at footnote 55 .
41 Wright, Miller and Cooper, op. cit., footnote 5, para . 4464, p. 583.
4- Ratliff, loc. cit., footnote 11, at p. 89 .




sympathetic award, even if the liability proof does not quite justify it,
if it appears that the defendant can easily afford to pay".'
A third argument questions the contribution of non-mutual preclusion
in preventing the legal system from embarrassing itself through inconsistent
determinations . Although it "somewhatreduces the potential for inconsistent
decisions",45 it in no way ensures this because (a) it is unavailable where
its application would be unfair to the defendant, and (b) it does nothing
to prevent relitigation of the same question if the plaintiff loses the first
case .46
Even accepting the merit of these arguments, offensive non-mutual
preclusion remains justified because of (a) "its contribution to judicial
efficiency"47 (sparing one party the cost of ever litigating the issue and
protecting the court system and other litigants against the delay and burdens
entailed by relitigation) and (b) its ability to bring about at least a partial
reduction of inconsistent decisions . And surely these are sufficient justi-
fications48 To be acceptable, however, the doctrine must ensure fairness
to the defendant by a careful determination that, in the first action, the
defendant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate and that, therefore,
to apply preclusion would be fair . Moreover, the doctrine must be
administered in such a way as to disarm the "option effect"49 (the "free-
riderism")50 that it offers to "wait and see" plaintiffs. (How this might
be done is discussed infra, in part Vg.) .51
111. The English Experience
The traditional English rule requiring the same parties/mutuality for the
application of issue estoppel was invoked and rigourously applied by the
House of Lords in Carl Zeiss ,Stiftung v . Raynor & Keeler Ltd (No. 2),52
44 Ibid, at p. 94, observing that a "long-recognized exception to collateral estoppel
exists for findings that result from compromise verdicts . See Restatement (Second) of
Judgments, para. 29(5) (1980). Courts have not paid much attention, however, to the
idea that juries might make a modest redistribution of wealth in a sympathetic case, but
not if they thought that a judgment could break the bank".
45 Ibid, at p. 100.
46 Ibid
47 Ibid; Wright, Miller and Cooper, op. ci!, footnote 5, para. 4464.
48 1n the United States most criticisms of the doctrine come from commentators rather
than from courts . Courts undoubtedly have a self-interest in avoiding relitigation, but there
is also a societal interest in avoiding wasteful relitigation .
49 See Ratliff, loc. cit., footnote 11 .
50 See L.C. George, Sweet Uses of Adversity: Parklane Hosiery and the Collateral
Class Action (1979-80), 32 Stan. L. Rev. 655.
51 Infra, p. 656.
52 [1967] 1 A.C. 853, [1966] 2 All E.R. 536 (13.L.) . The facts and legal issues in
this case were complex, but for our purposes the essential facts were that in previous
litigation in vilest Germany between the East German Council of Jera and a West German
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and to document the English contribution to the abandonment of mutuality
we need to look at subsequent cases .53 As we will see, in Canada there
has been a plethora of cases in recent years on the issue of mutuality.
By contrast, the English cases are few in number: indeed, there appears
only to be six of them .
In Gleeson v. J. Wippell & Co. Ltd,54 on very appealing facts, Megarry
V.C. refused to abandon mutuality and adopt defensive non-mutual issue
estoppel (or even to find privity) . In prior litigation, Gleeson (the present
plaintiff) had sued a shirt manufacturer, D. Ltd., and had been unsuccessful
in her attempt to establish that D. Ltd. had infringed her copyright in
her drawings of a shirt with a clerical collar attached . She then brought
an action against W. Ltd., who had not been a party to the original action,
but was the company that had supplied D. Ltd. with the very shirt design
which had been in issue in the first action. W. Ltd. moved to strike out
the statement of claim as an abuse of process on the ground that the
central issue raised by the plaintiff in the second action (that is, whether
W.'s shirts were copies of her drawings), had already been litigated and
determined in the action against D. Ltd. While observing that the English
authorities were quite unclear as to what constituted privity for the purpose
of issue estoppel, Megarry V.C. attempted to resolve the problem of privity
by invoking mutuality: if the defendant in the second action was really
in privity with the defendant in the first action, would they have been
bound in the second action by a decision in favour of the plaintiff in
the first action? It would be most unjust, he observed, to so preclude
W. Ltd. by a decision reached in a case in which it was not a party
and in which it had no voice. In the end he concluded that neither issue
estoppel nor abuse of process was applicable . Thus the plaintiff was allowed
to relitigate the identical issue litigated in the first action by the simple
device of switching defendants (the very thing which the United States
courts in Bernhard and Blonder-Tongue had refused to permit).
company as to who owned the assets and name of Carl Zeiss, it had been decided that
the Council of Jera did not have title . Subsequently, in English proceedings the West
German company challenged the authority of English solicitors who had, on instructions
of the Council of Jera and in the name of Carl Zeiss, commenced a passing off action
in England against the West German company. Although by challenging the authority
of the plaintiffs solicitors the West German company was simply asserting issue estoppel
against the Council of Jera, it was held that since the respondent to the interlocutory
application was the English firm of solicitors, and they were not parties or privies to the
prior adjudication in West Germany, the issue estoppel argument failed . See, Herman and
Hayden, loc. cR, footnote 5, at pp. 443-444.
53 For a much earlier case forbidding a defendant from relitigating an issue which
had been decided between him and a different party, see Reichel v . MacGrath (1889),
14 App. Cas. 665 (H.L .) .




By far the most important English decision is the Birmingham Bombers
case.ss The plaintiffs, who were alleged to be members of the IRA, had
been previously convicted of the horrible bombing of a hotel which caused
the death of numerous people . Subsequently they brought a damage action
against the police for allegedly beating them during their interrogation .
uring the course of the earlier criminal trial the accused had specifically
raised this issue by alleging that their confessions had been beaten out
of them, and both the judge (on the voir dire) and the jury had rejected
this contention and held the confessions to be voluntary . In the subsequent
civil action the police argued that there was an issue estoppel arising from
earlier criminal proceedings. In the Court of Appeal, Lord Kenning based
the dismissal of the action on the ground of non-mutual issue estoppel,
holding that, for issue estoppel to apply, it should no longer be necessary,
as required by traditional doctrine, that there be the same parties in both
the former and the present action . What was essential, he held, is that
the person against whom the estoppel was now sought to be pleaded (that
is, the present plaintiff) was a party to the earlier proceeding . In so doing
Lord Kenning referred to, and specifically embraced, the doctrine of non-
mutual issue estoppel as developed in the United States .56 ®n the question
of abandoning mutuality, Doff L.J. dissented, insisting that mutuality and
privity must remain, but holding that the action should be dismissed on
the grounds of "abuse of process" arising from the fact that the very issue
that the plaintiffs sought to raise had already been decided against them
in the prior proceeding on the criminal standard ofproofbeyond areasonable
doubt. In his reasons Lord Kenning anticipated Doff L. .I .'s invocation of
abuse of process, and stated that "the real reason why the claim was struck
out was because the self same issue had previously been determined against
ss McRkenney v. Chief Constable of West Midlands Police Force, supra, footnote 17,
affirmed sub nom Hunter v. Chief Constable of West Midlands, [1982] A.C. 529, [1981]
3 All E.R. 727 (H.L.) .
56 The case before him was one ofdefensive preclusion and the American cases referred
to by Lord Denning were all cases involving defensive issue estoppel . But Lord Denning
did not so limit his analysis and he specifically referred to, illustrated and approved of
the offensive use of non-mutual issue estoppel; ibid, at pp. 320-321 (Q.B.), 238 (All E.R .) .
The judgment is classic Lord Denning, analytically powerful, provocative and ground-
breaking, at least for Commonwealth law. Stylistically he was in top form . His statement
of the facts was in his now famous staccato. It drew from Lord Diplock the comment
"to paraphrase it would only be to spoil it, to improve upon it would be impossible".
Introducing his discussion ofthe law, Lord Denning makesbrilliantuse of metaphor, referring
to the "house called Estoppel", with "many rooms" and "rickety chairs" . Moreover, he
got his "final revenge" by being able to state that "[b]eyond doubt, Hollington v. Hewthorn
[1943] K.B. 587 was wrongly decided" (see infra, footnote 78). He had, of course, been
losing counsel in the case. (But we see the further comments made by Lord Denning,
referred to in footnote 58, infra) .
57 Ibid, at pp. 322 (Q.B .), 239 (All E.R .) .
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the party by a court of competent jurisdiction . What is that but issue
estoppel?"57 Lord Denning continued :58
The truth is that as of the date of those cases the doctrine of issue estoppel
had not emerged as a separate doctrine. So the courts found it necessary to put
it on "abuse of the process of the court." Nowthat issue estoppel is fully recognized,
it is better to reach the decision on that ground : rather than on the vague phrase
"abuse of the process of the court." Each doctrine is based on the same considerations
and produces the same result .
On appeal, the House of Lords declined in the circumstances to accept
Lord Denning's reasons and instead it rested its decision on the "vague"
concept of abuse of process.59 Lord Diplock stated60
Nevertheless, it is my own view, which I understand is shared by all of your
Lordships, that it would be best, in order to avoid confusion, if the use of the description
"issue estoppel" in English law, at any rate (it does not appear to have been adopted
in the United States), were restricted to that species of estoppel per rem judicatam
that may arise in civil actions between the same parties or their privies. . . .
As with any court decision, and particularly significant ones, the
question becomes: how is the decision in Hunter to be interpreted? Broadly
or narrowly? A broad reading is that in striking out the plaintiffs action
as an "abuse of process" the court, in effect, embraced the doctrine of
58 Ibid Just as hard cases make bad law, easy cases with "attractive" facts may give
the impetus to bold developments . It seems reasonably clear that in theBirmingham Bombers
case, the plaintiffs were seen as being "bad persons"-vicious murderers as well as process
abusers-who should be stopped. (See Lord Denning's righteous comment, ibid., at pp . 323-
324 (Q.13.), 240 (All E.R .), that this "case shows what a civilized country we are", since
these were men who had been found guilty of "most wicked murder", who had in their
evidence been guilty of "gross perjury", yet the state "lavished large sums on their defence"
and continued "to lavish large sums on them-in their actions against the police . . . . It
is a scandal that it should be allowed to continue") . The circumstances in Demeter v.
British Pacific Life Insurance Co. (1984), 13 D.L.R. (4th) 318, 48 O.R . (2d) 266 (Ont.
C.A .), were similar . Note also that in Parklane the persons estopped had been found to
have engaged in at least illegal if not criminal, conduct.
59 Hunter v. Chief Constable of West Midlands, supra, footnote 55 . It seems quite
wrong to treat the decision in Hunter as a considered rejection of Lord Denning's approach
to the abandonment of mutuality . At the outset of the argument, Lord Diplock encouraged
the appellants to concentrate on abuse of process rather than issue estoppel. While the
American cases were argued and discussed in the judgments, they were conspicuously
absent from both the argument and the judgments in the House of Lords. Lord Diplock
stressed, ibid, at pp . 540 (A.C.), 732 (All E.R.). that the argument in the case had been
directed tothe question ofwhether Goff L.J.'sjudgment-which turned on abuse ofprocess-
was sustainable. After the argument of the plaintiff, counsel for the police were not even
called upon . In his reasons Lord Diplock stated that if what the plaintiff was seeking
to do was an abuse of process, whether it also qualifies to bear the label "issue estoppel"
was a matter "not of substance but of semantics" and since it could not possibly affect
the outcome of the appeal, it did not justify the public expense that would be involved
in considering the matter. In short, the House of Lords did not deal with Lord Denning's
arguments in any detail, and indeed it did not encourage or permit that issue to be argued
on the appeal.




"defensive non-mutual issue estoppel" but with a different name tag. The
crucial passage from Lord Diplock's judgment is the following:61
The abuse of process which the instant case exemplifies is the initiation of
proceedings in a court of justice for the purpose of mounting a collateral attack
upon a final decision against the intending plaintiff which has been made by another
court ofcompetent jurisdiction in previous proceedings in which the intending plaintiff
had a full opportunity of contesting the decision in the court by which it was made.
While it may be predicated with some confidence that ultimately Hunter
will be read broadly, even in England,62 Lord Diplock likely intended
a narrower reading.63 The narrow reading is that abuse of process does
not arise simply from the fact that, in subsequent litigation, a party raises
a question already decided in earlier litigation, but requires that the party
seeking to relitigate has an "ulterior motive" in the sense that it is not
his or her genuine purpose to obtain the relief sought in the second action,
but some collateral purpose. As Lord Diplock made clear this was certainly
the situation in Hunter. The Home Office was a co-defendant in the case
and had accepted liability for the assaults on the plaintiffs by the prison
officers, which had occurred after the statements to the police had been
made. The plaintiffs were entitled to have their damages assessed against
the Home Office but, instead, they continued the action against the police .
Lord Diplock was explicit in his view that the purpose of the attempt
at re-litigation was merelyto mounta collateral attack on the prior decision.64
61 Ibid, at pp . 541 (A.C.), 733 (All E.R.) .
62A number o£ Canadian courts have given Hunter a broad reading . See the cases
discussed, Part Iv; infra, p. 643; in particular Holt v. Ashfield (1986), 77 N.B.R . (2d)
121 (N.B.Q.B.); Bomac Construction Limited v . Stevenson, [1986] 5 W.W.R. 21 (Sask.
C.A .) . For a broad English reading, see North West Water Authority v. Binnie and Partners
(1990), 140 New L.J. 130 (Q.B.), discussed infra, the text at footnote 70 .
63 For a subsequent narrow English reading of the case, see Bragg v. Oceanus Mutual
Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd, supra, footnote 2 (discussed infra, the text at
footnote 67). For similar narrow readings of the Hunter principle in Canada, see, for
example, Taylor v . Baribeau (1985), 21 D.L.R. (4th) 140, 51 O.R. (2d) 541 (Ont. Div.
Ct.) (discussed infra, in footnote 89), and Re Del Core and Ontario College ofPharmacists
(1985), 19 D.L.R. (4th) 68, 51 O.R . (2d) 1 (Ont. C.A .) (discussed infra, in footnote 87) .
64 The Birmingham Bombers have continued a long struggle to have their convictions
reversed through other means. See B . Hilliard, Soldiers of Nothing (1990), 140 New L.J.
160. For an extensive and critical analysis of the treatment of the Birmingham Bombers,
see C . Mullen, Error of Judgment: The Truth About the Birmingham Bombers (1990) .
Subsequent to their civil action, the case was investigated by a different police force whose
findings were considered by the Court of Appeal in January, 1987 at which time the
court upheld the convictions . In March, 1990 the Home Secretary ordered that the police
inquiry into the case be reopened to examine new evidence which might provide grounds
for further reference to the Court of Appeal . The new evidence includes revelations that
several members of the now disbanded west Midlands Serious Crime Squad (which had
investigated the Bombers) extracted confessions from men, allegedly by brutality. See, The
Guardian, March 22, 1990, p. 1 . Subsequently, see the Globe and Mail, September 3,
1990, P. A13 . The Home Secretary again referred the case to the Court of Appeal on
the ground that newevidence "mightbe thought to cast doubt on the safety ofthe convictions",
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Of the four English cases subsequent to Hunter, two are of minor
significance. In Tebbutt v. Haynes,bs Lord Denning stuck to his "non-mutual
guns" in a case decided before the appeal in Hunter, and in Somasundaram
v. M. Julius Melchior & Co.66 the Court of Appeal unnecessarily invoked
Hunter in an action by a disgruntled convicted plaintiffwhosuedhis solicitor.
However, the other two cases are worthy of some analysis .
Braggv. Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd.67
presented the court with a case of offensive non-mutual issue estoppel
notwithstanding that the pending police inquiry was not expected to be completed for
several months.
These events may seem to make it ironic to use their civil case as a major basis
for an argument for issue preclusion, particularly in light of the ultimate acquittal of the
"Guildford Four", (whose bombing convictions were referred to and quashed by the Court
of Appeal after they had spent fifteen years in prison) and the release of the "Maguire
Seven" (whose convictions for operating a bomb factory were declared by the Director
of Public Prosecutions to be unsafe after the accused had spent ten years in jail) . See
S. Edwards, From Scapegoats to Sacrificial Lambs: The Guildford Four Affair (1989),
139 New L.J . 1449 . But see the comments, supra, footnote 40. In cases like these, to
avoid the chaos of relitigation, we must leave reconsideration of unsound verdicts to the
type of rehearings used in those cases (satisfactory or unsatisfactory as they may be), rather
than to private attempts at collateral attack .
65 [1981] 2 All E.R. 238 (C.A .), (following her husband's disappearance, a wife's
claim to the matrimonial home was dismissed, the court holding that the husband's mother
owned the house. In a subsequent action by the mother against the husband and wife
for a declaration of ownership, the wife counterclaimed for an order that she owned the
house; applying Mcllkenney, Lord Denning held that issue estoppel precluded her
counterclaim) .
66 [1988] 1W.L.R. 1394, [1989] 1 All E.R. 129 (C.A .), and see J.A . Jolowicz, Comment,
[1989] Camb . L.J. 196. A plaintiff who had pleaded guilty to a criminal offence and
been convicted, sued his solicitors for negligence in pressuring him to plead guilty . The
court held that, because the action would impugn the correctness of the final decision
of the criminal court, the plaintiffs claim necessarily involved a collateral attack on the
correctness of this conviction, and it should be struck out as an abuse of process . It is
submitted that this holding was both unnecessary and unsound, though this would be
more readily apparent to somebody who comes from ajurisdiction which does not recognize
a barrister's immunity, such as Canada; see Demarco v. Ungaro (1979), 95 D.L.R. (3d)
385, 21 O.R. (2d) 673 (Ont. H.C .) . If the case is correct it would stop even a bona
fide plaintiff who wanted to prove that as a result of (clear) negligence on the part of
his solicitor he lost his case. Surely the case is distinguishable from Hunter. The alternative
holding of the court in Somasundaram was the appropriate way to deal with the problem
facing the court. It held that on the basis of the substantial affidavit evidence filed the
plaintiffs claim should be struck out as being vexatious and frivolous. This holding, which
was in effect a holding that summary judgment should go against the plaintiff because
he was bound to fail on the facts at trial, is the proper way to deal with the problem
presented by this case. There was no need to invoke the unruly doctrine of abuse of
process in order to dispose fairly of the case.
67 Supra, footnote 2. The subsequent history of the two actions is of some interest .
Action #2, Bragg, went to trial but was settled; see, [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep., at p. 489
(C.A .) . Subsequently, the decision reached at trial in action #1 (that is, defendants were
not liable because no misrepresentation) was reversed on appeal ; see, CTL v. Oceanus




which it rejected (a) on the grounds of a narrow reading of Hunter, and
(b) on further grounds which would also have led an American court
to reject issue estoppel . The case concerned two actions for millions of
dollars against insurers arising out of contracts of insurance on containers
leased to shipping lines. Central to the case were allegations of misrepre-
sentations in the placing of the insurance. Two actions were brought against
a common defendant, ®ceanus, which moved to have the two actions
consolidated. This was successfully opposed by the plaintiffs in both actions .
Action #1 then went to trial and ®ceanus failed in its defence that
misrepresentations had been made by an insurance agent in placing the
insurance with ®ceanus. In the second action the defendant sought to
raise the same defence, and the plaintiffs moved to have the defence struck
out as an abuse of process. Reading Hunter narrowly, the court concluded
that ®ceanus was not pursuing some ulterior or collateral purpose in putting
forth the same defence, but had the genuine purpose of attempting to
defeat the liability asserted against them .68
But it is the court's handling of the other issues which is of greater
interest, since they mirror two of the exceptions to the application of non-
mutual issue estoppel enunciated by the United Mates Supreme Court in
arklane. By opposing consolidation of the two actions the plaintiff in
the second action was a "wait and see" plaintiff. That the defence of
misrepresentation would have to be relitigated was directly attributable
to the plaintiffs conduct. "The overriding consideration is that ®ceanus
have done nothing to bring this unfortunate situation about; indeed, they
have sought to avoid it"69 The further ground for rejecting the plea of
estoppel here was that the second action -would provide the defendant
with a significant procedural advantage unavailable to it in the first action.
The court observed that at the first trial ®ceanus hadhad to call a number
of Lloyd's underwriters (the plaintiffs in the second action) on subpoena
as their own witnesses, and under the English practice they were not
permitted to cross-examine them. The evidence ofthese witnesses washighly
material to the defence pleaded, and in the second action the defendant
would be entitled to cross-examine these witnesses.
The last English case, the recent decision by Drake d. in Forth West
Water Authority v. Binnie & Partners 70 is of interest because of comments
in the judgment, rather than because non-mutuality was actually involved.
At issue was amass accident-the Abbeystead disaster-in which six people
were killed and thirty-eight injured-in an explosion of methane gas in
68 However, it is interesting to note that the court would not be drawn into defining
what is an abuse of process . 1£err L.J. stated (ibid, at p. 137), that it "would be wrong
to attempt to categorize the situations which might constitute abuse of process" . Sir David
Cairns, said (ibid, at p. 138), "it would be dangerous to attempt to define fully what
are the circumstances which should lead to a finding of abuse of process".
69 Ibid., at p. 138.
70 Supra, footnote 62 .
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a water pumping system designed by Binnie. In an earlier action (action
#1), brought by the victims, and in which both Binnie and the Water
Authority were defendants, it was held that Binnie was negligent and solely
responsible for the explosion . In the North West Water Authority case
the Water Authority sued the engineers for £2,000,000 for property damage
caused by the explosion and it moved to strike out the engineers' denial
of negligence on the grounds that issue had already been decided in the
earlier action, arguing both issue estoppel and abuse of process. Binnie's
position was that neither doctrine should apply because in the first action
(a) they had litigated with the plaintiffs (not with the Water Authority),
and (b) they had not pleaded contributory negligence against the Water
Authority, and they now intended to do so.
In action #1, the WaterAuthority had allegednegligence against Binnie,
although Binnie had made no allegations of negligence against the Water
Authority . In that action the trial judge had found both defendants at
fault and had apportioned liability between them, but the Court of Appeal
held Binnie to be solely at fault . Drake J. concluded that there was no
doubt that in action #1 the issue of negligence had been litigated and
decided between the Water Authority and Binnie.
In his reasons, Drake J. noted that the authorities revealed two schools
of thought on the scope of issue estoppel . The narrow approach limits
the doctrine to the same parties (citing Hunter), while the broad approach
(citing Lord Denning in Mcldkenney) holds that the true test ofissue estoppel
is whether the party seeking to put forward some issue had already had
that issue decided against him by a prior court, even if the parties to
the two actions are different . He then proceeded to hold that here the
attempt by Binnie to relitigate the issue already decided was an abuse
of process. Alternatively, he held that Binnie was also estopped by issue
estoppel, and stated that in his view the broader approach to issue estoppel
was the correct one, that is, even as against a non-party, issue estoppel
should apply where the present defendant had already had a full and fair
opportunity of litigating the issue.
Given the actual facts of the case, it can easily be argued that, properly
analyzed, it involved no question of non-mutuality at all, since the relevant
parties were parties to both actions. Hence any observations about non
mutuality were pure obiter. However, it represents another judicial vote
in favour of non-mutual preclusion and, if Drake J. is to be taken at
his word, had the second action been brought by the remaining victims
against Binnie, he would have held that issue estoppel applied.71
71 Binnie complained that at the earlier trial they had been refused leave to use in
evidence an adverse report prepared by the Water Authority because, inter alia, of the
lateness of the request to do so, and that they intended to use the report in the second
action . This suggests anargument that the second action would afford animportant procedural




A. Introduction and Summary
IV . The Canadian Experience
ft is possible to argue about the present and future direction off the
English law of issue estoppel. However, the direction of Canadian law
seems clear. If mutuality is not a dead letter, it appears at best to be
in its death throes. If law is what the courts do in fact, then in Canada
all that remains to be done now is to give mutuality the ceremony of
a decent burial (a step which is complicated by obiter in the Supreme
Court of Canada).72 Since the mid seventies there have been no less than
twenty-three cases permitting a non-party to obtain "some preclusive
effect"73 from a prior judgment in subsequent litigation with persons who
were parties to the former judgment74
footnote 2, discussed in the text at footnote 67). But the point is far from clear because
the trial judge also stated that the report was "not necessary for the fair determination
of the issue between the parties" . Moreover, it is unclear that such a procedural difference
is a relevant consideration where the subsequent litigation is between the sameparties.
72 A difficulty facing lower Canadian courts in resolving the mutuality problem logically
and in the way they seem to wish to go, is the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
in Angle v. Minister of National Revenue, supra, footnote 10 . There, the court set forth
the traditional requirements for the application of issue estoppel, including the requirement
that the two proceedings be between the same parties or their privies. However, the court's
statement was a general one and the case itself did not involve any problem of different
parties. Although the case was not about mutuality, it is frequently referred to by lower
courts as being binding on them as to the requirement of "same parties" . This has had
an unfortunate and distorting effect on the handling of the problem by lower courts . An
appeal is currently pending before the court in the case of Ahobelli v. Pilot Insurance
Co. (1987), 19 C.P.C. (2d) 5 (Ont. I9ist . Ct.), varied on appeal (1989), 34 C.P.C . (2d)
193 (Ont . C.A.) (discussed infra, in footnotes 75 and 81), which will likely address this
issue.
73 Supra, footnote 2.
74 Indeed over this period there appears to be only one case refusing some preclusive
effect in favour of a non-party against persons who were parties to the former proceeding
in circumstances where American courts would have granted non-mutual issue estoppel:
see Beaulieu v. McLaughlin, supra, footnote 2 (discussed infra, in footnote 81). But see
the cases referred to infra, footnote 89.
In several cases, the courts have refused to permit issue estoppel to be pleaded against
a person who was not a party to the original proceeding, results which are fully consistent
with an abandonment of mutuality, since to decide otherwise would be to deprive a party
of his or her day in court. See, Kraemer v. Lindsay Specialty Products Ltd (1986), 8
C.I.P.R . 84 (Fed. T.D.) (in prior proceedings between P and D1, P's patent had been
declared invalid ; in the subsequent patent infringement action by P against I)2, P claimed
that by reason of the prior litigation, there was an issue estoppel with regard to the validity
of its patent; the court, quite properly, rejected the argument); Bank ofMontreal v. Kuzma
(1984), 46 C.P.C. 303 (Bask. Q.B.) (in a matrimonial property action between husband
and wife it was held that the husband should be liable for his wife's promissory note
to the bank; in a subsequent action by the bank to recover on the note from the wife
she was not permitted to plead issue estoppel as against the bank).
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Canadian courts have resorted to three distinct techniques to achieve
this objective : (1) abuse of process has been used as the equivalent of
defensive non-mutual issue estoppel ; (2) a form of offensive non-mutual
"preclusion" has been achieved through using prior adjudications as "prima
facie evidence subject to rebuttal" ; and finally (3) abuse of process has
been used to establish offensive non-mutual issue estoppel. In addition
to these techniques courts have also resorted to circumventing the mutuality
problem through the application or manipulation of the privity concept75
B. Defensive Non-Mutual Estoppel Through the Use ofAbuse of Process
The House of Lord's "abuse of process" doctrine found its way into
Canadian law in Demeter v. British Pacific Life Insurance Co.7b Demeter
had been convicted of murdering his wife by arranging for her to be killed
by persons "unknown", Subsequently, Demeterbrought an action to recover
on life insurance policies he held on his wife. The Ontario Court of Appeal,
in a briefjudgment which affirmed the decision at first instance, had little
difficulty in concluding that the action should be struck out as an "abuse
of process" because the real purpose of the action (as Demeter had frankly
admitted on his pre-trial examination for discovery) was to attempt to
retry the issue of Demeter's guilt . Neither at first instance nor in the Court
of Appeal was there any discussion, either pro or con, of the doctrine
of non-mutual issue estoppel, and the decision rested squarely on the narrow
principle enunciated in Hunter. (Indeed, neither party had an interest in
arguing for the existence of the doctrine of non-mutual issue estoppel in
Demeter. it would not have helped Demeter, and the insurance companies
had an easier case arguing abuse of process). However, the Demeter case
represented a lost opportunity to embrace Lord Denning's reasoning in
McIlkenney .
75 Grewal v. Small (1985), 69 B.C.LR. 121 (B.C .S.C.) (employer of truck driver
found to be in privity with the employee); Richards v. Continental Casualty Co. (1986),
47 Alta. L. Rep. (2d) 44 (Alta. Q.B .), affirmed (1987), 53 Alta . L. Rep. (2d) 76 (Alfa .
C.A .) (insurer found to be in privity with its insured); Altobelli v. Pilot Insurance Co.,
supra, footnote 72 (plaintiffs own disability insurers held to be in privity with the tortfeasor
defendant originally sued by plaintiff; varied on appeal on the ground that it was premature
at the interlocutory stage to determine the question of issue estoppel and the case should
proceed to trial ; an appeal in this case is presently pending in the Supreme Court of
Canada); Vautour v. Province of NewBrunswick (1985), 62 N.B.R. (2d) 142 (N.B .C.A.)
(Federal and Provincial Crown held to be in privity on the theory that the Crown is
indivisible) ; but see, Verlysdonk v. PremierPetrenas Construction Co. Ltd (1987), 39 D.L.R .
(4th) 715, 60 O.R . (2d) 65 (Ont. Div. Ct .) (argument that plaintiffs home owner insurer
and the tortfeasor who injured the plaintiff were in privity, rejected in circumstances where
preclusion was, in any event, inappropriate) .




t first instance77 Osler J. had followed the lead of ford Diplock
(in Hunter) in holding that Hollington v. Hewthorn7s was wrongly decided
and did not represent the law in Ontario and that:79
. . . if the action is to go forward, proof of the conviction of the plaintiff for the
murder of his wife may be adduced in evidence and, if this is done, should be
regarded as prima facie proof of that issue, subject to rebuttal by the plaintiff on
the merits.
In affirming the judgment at first instance, the Court of Appeal agreed
with the conclusion that Hollington is not the law in Ontario, but made
no specific reference to whether a previous conviction should go in as
prima facie proof. (As we will . see, in subsequent Canadian cases Osler
J.'s rejection of Hollington has led to another route for giving "estoppel
effect" to earlier judgments, through the device of permitting them to be
used as "prima facie proof subject to rebuttal") .
In numerous cases the courts have permitted Demeter-type defensive
use of a prior judgment by a non-party against a party to the former
proceeding who had litigated and lost . In some of the cases the courts
have simply ignored the same parties requirement without anyexplanation,$°
but other cases have relied directly on the Hunter/Demeter concept of
abuse of process.81
77 (1983), 150 D.L.R. (3d) 249, at p. 264, 43 O.R. (2d) 33, at p. 48 (Ont. II.C.).
7s [1943) K.B. 587, [194312 All E.R . 35 (C.A.). There, in the context of an attempt
to introduce a prior traffic conviction as evidence in a subsequent civil motor vehicle
accident case, it was held that prior criminal convictions were inadmissible as evidence
in subsequent civil proceedings . In England this decision has now been reversed by the
Civil Evidence Act, 1968, c. 64, s . 11 . Under s. 11, a previous conviction is admissible
in a subsequent civil action for the purpose of proving that the person committed the
offence and "he shall be taken to have committed that offence unless the contrary is proved".
(By s. 13 in a defamation action, where the question arises as the whether a person did
or did not commit a criminal offence, the previous conviction is conclusive) . One Canadian
jurisdiction, British Columbia, has adopted similar but not identical . legislation; see the
Evidence Act R.S.B.C . 1979, c. 116, ss . 80-81 (the weight to be given to the conviction
is a matter for the trier of fact) . See also, infra, footnote 132.
79 Supra, footnote 77, at pp. 264 (D.L.R .), 48 (O.R .) .
80 Ralston Purina. Canada Inc. v. Canada Packers Inc. (1985), 55 Nfld. and P.E .I .R.
254 (RE.I.S .C.) (feed supplier whose feed had been held to be exclusive cause of farmer's
loss, estopped from subsequently suing another feed supplier for contribution for damages
awarded in first action); see, also, LeBar v. Canada (1988), 90 N.R. 5 (Fed. C.A .) (Crown
precluded from relitigating issue it had already lost against different plaintiff) .
si Bank of B.C. v. Singh (1987), 17 B.C.L.R . (2d) 256 (B.C .S .C .) (where a court
had earlier approved mortgage sale by bank, subsequent action against the bank's appraiser
for negligence in not recommending appropriate price, struck out as an abuse of process);
Breen v. Saunders (1986), 69 N.B.R. (2d) 427 (N.B.Q.B .) (action by convicted plaintiff
against police for wrongful arrest and imprisonment in relation to the offence, struck out
as abuse of process); Bank ofMontreal v. Crosson (1979), 96 D.L.R . (3d) 765, 23 O.R .
(2d) 625 (Ont. II.C.) (plaintiff bank which had moved unsuccessfully for judgment against
one of several guarantors who delivered identical defences was prohibited from moving
for judgment against the other defendants on the ground that it would be an abuse of
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The case that best demonstrates this approach is the decision of the
Manitoba Court of Appeal in Solomon v. Smith,s2 which presented a classic
situation for the application of defensive non-mutual issue estoppel . In
an earlier Alberta action, Solomon had been found liable to the vendor
for damages for breach of a real estate contract. Solomon had been the
purchaser under the contract, and in the Alberta action he had unsuccessfully
raised the defence of misrepresentation concerning the sale. Subsequently,
Solomon instituted an action in Manitoba to recover the damages (awarded
againsthim in the earlier action) from the vendor's agents whohadnegotiated
the contract, alleging that they had made misrepresentations respecting the
property . The Manitoba Court of Appeal held that the plaintiffs action
should be struck out as an abuse of process. The court stated that the
reasoning in Parklane abandoning the "same parties" requirement for issue
estoppel was persuasive, but the Supreme Court of Canada83 had affirmed
this requirement and, hence, issue estoppel could not be relied on . However,
the court held that the applicable principle was abuse of process.
Lyon J.A . stated :84
I agree . . . that a plea of issue estoppel is not available . However, to permit
the statement of claim to proceed would be an abuse of process and that is the
principle applicable . In considering this doctrine, it seems to me prudent to avoid
hard and fast, institutionalized rules such as those which attach to the plea of issue
estoppel . By encouraging the determination of each case on its own facts against
the general principle of the plea of abuse, serious prejudice to either party as well
as to the proper administration of justice can best be avoided . . . we must be vigilant
to ensure that the system does not become unnecessarily clogged with repetitious
litigation of the kind here attempted. There should be an end to this litigation . To
allow the plaintiff to retry the issue of misrepresentation would be a classic example
of abuse of process-a waste of time and resources of litigants and the Court and
an erosion of the principle of finality so crucial to the proper administration of
justice.
process) ; see, also, Altobelli v. Pilot Insurance Co., supra, footnote 72 (where the major
thrust of the reasons of the court of first instance were expressed in non-mutual issue
estoppel terms, although the final decision was put on the ground of privity) ; but see,
Beaulieu v. McLaughlin, supra, footnote 2 (in the first proceeding the plaintiff mortgagor
had sued the mortgagee bank and the court held that there was no misrepresentation
by the bank's solicitor (a non-party); in a subsequent action by the mortgagor against
the solicitor alleging misrepresentation, the solicitor was unsuccessful in having the claim
struck out on the ground that the issue of misrepresentation had been decided in the earlier
proceedings ; issue estoppel was inapplicable since the solicitor was not a party to the
previous action; moreover no abuse of process would occur by permitting the second action
to proceed). But contrast Solomon v. Smith (1987), 22 C.P.C . (2d) 12 (Man . C.A.) (discussed
infra, the text at footnote 82), which arrived at a directly contrary conclusion.
82 Ibid
83 In Angle v. Minister ofNational Revenue, supra, footnote 10.




This decision demonstrates that Canadian courts are willing to achieve
the same results as United States courts by simply using abuse of process
as a surrogate for defensive non-mutual issue estoppel.85
C. Offensive "Estoppel" By Using a Prior Adjudication as `Prima Facie
Evidence Subject to Rebuttal"
It has already been noted that in Demeter it was held that llollington
was wrongly decided, did not represent the law in Ontario and (at first
instance) that it would be appropriate to use aprevious criminal conviction
of a party in subsequent litigation as prima facie proof, subject to rebuttal
on the merits . In so doing, the court sanctioned the importation into Ontario
law of the principle found in the English Civil Evidence Act, 1968, s. 11 .86
In araftofcases after the decision inDemeter, plaintiffs have successfully
used previous criminal convictions offensively against a previously convicted
defendant . Since these were cases of offensive usage, the basic "defensive"
abuse of process analysis ofDemeter andHunter were inapplicable. Usually
no attempt was made to mounta straight offensive non-mutual issue estoppel
argument, along the lines of.Mcllkenney or the American authorities. Instead
the cases have picked up on the language used by Osler J. in Demeter
and have permitted the use of a previous criminal conviction as "prima
facie evidence subject to rebuttal" .87 Typically these cases have involved
85 In a rare example of Canadian courts showing sensitivity to the type of qualifications
set forth in Parklane, the court in Solomon stated (ibid, at pp . 19-20) :
Of course, if it can be shown that statutory provisions, rules of procedure or other
cause substantially alter the mode of trial or the degree of proof required as between
one province and another, the application of the principle would and should fail .
Such a substantial difference would be a legitimate defence against the plea of abuse
ofprocess . The record before ushowever shows no such substantial variation in statutory
requirements, procedural practices or other cause. . . .
In Verlysdonk v. Premier Petrenas Construction Co. Ltd, supra, footnote 75, at pp . 721
(D.L.R .), 71 (O.R.), the court pointed out that one of the reasons why preclusion would
be inappropriate is that the appraisal process used to determine the plaintiffs recovery
in the first action did not afford the appellant "a full and fair opportunity of dealing
with the whole case".
86 See supra, footnote 78 .
97 Re Del Core v. Ontario College of Pharmacists, supra, footnote 63 (pharmacists
discipline committee entitled touse previous conviction ofpharmacist asprimafacieevidence,
but not conclusive proof and the pharmacist had the right to adduce rebuttal evidence);
Q. v. Minto Management Ltd (1985), 15 D.L.R . (4th) 581, 46 O.R . (2d) 756 (Ont . H.C.)
(in an action for damages for sexual assault the plaintiff sought to rely on the earlier
conviction of the individual defendant for the assault; the previous conviction was held
to be admissible even as against the corporate defendant, the individual defendant's employer,
who had not been involved in the criminal trial; however, neither of the defendants were
foreclosed from introducing evidence that the sexual assault had not been committed);
Royal Bank v. McArthur (1985), 19 D.L.R. (4th) 762, 51 O.R. (2d) 86 (Ont . Div. Ct.)
(plaintiff suing for damages for conversion entitled to use prior conviction for conspiracy
to rob and robbery as prima facie evidence); Clairborne Industries Ltd v. National Bank
of Canada (1986), 28 D.L.R. (4th) 695, 55 O.R . (2d) 289 (Ont. H.C .) (prior criminal
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prior criminal convictions, although at least two cases have involved using
prior civil adjudications as primafacie evidence subject to rebuttal.$$ Only
rarely in these cases has the argument been made that true preclusive effect
should be given to the prior finding .s9 Two of the cases involved the issue
actually faced by the court in Hollington: that is, what effect should be
given in a subsequent automobile negligence action to the prior conviction
of one of the parties for the violation of highway traffic laws 9° (These
cases raise the question of whether, if the courts openly adopt a general
principle of offensive non-mutual issue estoppel as in Parklane, there is
any justification for ever refusing total preclusion in favour of using a
previous finding or conviction as prima facie evidence subject to rebuttal .
This matter is explored in detail below)9I
D. Mutuality Abandoned Offensive Issue Estoppel Through the Use of
Abuse ofProcess
This final group of cases is the most interesting and promising . They
have abandoned mutuality92 by the device of calling situations where a
convictions admissible as primafacie evidence against convicted defendants only and were
not evidence against non-convicted defendants) ; Hanson v. "Ocean Victoria"Daichi Tanker
KK, [1985] 1 F.C . 451 (Fed. T.D .) (conviction based on guilty plea admissible as prima
facie evidence) ; Coutte v. Antonenko (1986), 46 Sask. R. 161 (Sask. Q.B .) (guilty plea
receivable in evidence and explanation thereof rejected); Hutchinson v. York Sanitation
Co. (1986), 56 O.R . (2d) 778 (Master) (prior guilty plea admissible asprimafacie evidence
as to the facts).
88 Spataro v. Handler (1988), 26 C.P .C . (2d) 28 (Ont. Dist . Ct.) (prior finding of
professional misconduct by discipline committee admitted in subsequent civil action); Re
Rosenbaum andLaw Society ofManitoba (1983), 150 D.L.R . (3d) 352, [1983) 5 W.W.R.
752 (Man. Q.B .) (finding by a trial judge that a lawyer non-party witness had given false
testimony was held to be admissible in subsequent discipline proceeding against lawyer
as prima facie evidence, but could not be used as issue estoppel) .
89 Rosenbaum, ibid; Re Del Core and Ontario College ofPharmacists, supra, footnote
63; Taylor v. Baribeau, supra, footnote 63 (a party to a personal injury action who had
previously been convicted of a traffic offence and who was both defendant and plaintiff
by counterclaim in the motor vehicle action was unaffected by the doctrine of abuse of
process since it could have no application to him qua defendant (as he was not the aggressor)
and it would have no application to him qua plaintiff because he had a real interest in
the outcome of his claim for damages, and hence his motive was not improper) .
90 Taylor v. Baribeau, ibid., (prior conviction of the defendant for dangerous driving
was held to be admissible as prima facie proof only, subject to rebuttal on the merits);
Catty v. James (1985), 10 C.P.C. (2d) 313 (Ont. Dist. Ct .) (plaintiff's previous conviction
for careless driving, but not for speeding, was admissible as prima facie evidence; at a
trial before a jury the slight probative value of the speeding conviction was outweighed
by the very significant prejudicial effect on the jury).
91 See, infra, the text at footnote 123.
92 Holt v. Ashfield, supra, footnote 62, appears to be the only Canadian case flatly
abandoning mutuality, although it was a defensive estoppel case and could easily have
been decided on thebasis of traditionalprivity(plaintiff who unsuccessfully sued the purchaser
ofher mother's house claiming proprietary interest estopped from suing subsequent purchaser
of the house asserting same proprietary interest) . For a case abandoning mutuality, without
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plaintiff ,relies offensively on an earlier decision against the defendant, an
abuse of process. Typically, these cases have more or less come to grips
with the underlying policy and functional considerations by directly
discussing either McIlkenney or Parklane, or both93 What makes these
cases of particular interest is that two of there are decisions of provincial
appellate courts (and thus may well provide direction for the future) .
In Bomac Construction Ltd- v. Stevenson94 the Saskatchewan Court
of appeal faced the classic issue estoppel situation of an aircraft crash
resulting in injuries to multiple passengers. In the first action, the defendants
were held liable and in the second action, brought by a different passenger,
the plaintiff sought issue estoppel on the question ofthe defendants' liability.
The court held that, while issue estoppel could not apply because there
were got the same parties in each action, the doctrine of abuse of process
foreclosed the defendants (the plane owners and the pilot) from relitigatiog
this issue . The court observed that there is a general policy in the law
against relitigation of the same issue and that courts have not only viewed
such matters under the established doctrine of issue estoppel, but also sander
the broader heading of the concept of abuse of process. Referring to Lord
Diplock's judgment in hunter, the court stated that he had "made it clear
that he felt entitled to rely on the fact that proceedings constituted an
abuse of process even though the doctrine of issue estoppel did not clearly
apply".95 The court acknowledged that the concept of abuse of process
is usually considered applicable only to a plaintiffs claim so as to prevent
the commencement of certain types of actions, but there is no apparent
reason for its restriction to such circumstances when it is considered that
the purpose is to prevent the raising of an issue which has already been
squarely before the courts once before and the decision rendered . "There
seems little justification for concluding that such an issue cannot be raised
by a plaintiff but may be raised in defence by a defendant. If the concern
is a valid one, it should not matter by what process the concern is raised."96
95 Bid, at p. 26 .
96 Tbid , at p. 27 .
discussion, and permitting offensive preclusion, see Lepar v. Canada, supra, footnote 80,
discussed infra, the text at footnote 142.
93 An exception is a little noticed Ontario decision from the late 1970s which arrived
at a conclusion that was in some respects consistent with the American doctrine, although
without referring to the American case law: Nigro v. Agnew-Surpass Shoe Stores Ltd
(1977), 82 D.L.R . (3d) 302, 18 O.R. (2d) 215 (Ont . H.C.), affirmed (on a different point),
84 D.L.R. (3d) 256n, 18 O.R. (2d) 714n (Ont. C.A.), (where tenant had been, found
liable for shopping centre fire, in subsequent action by other tenants they were permitted
to rely upon issue estoppel; moreover, the new plaintiffs' claim against other co-defendants
who had been found not liable in the first action was dismissed on the ground that since
the plaintiffs were identifying themselves with the plaintiff in . the first action, they could
not take a position inconsistent with the finding in the first action that these other defendants
had not caused the fire) . The decision is fully analyzed in Herman and Hayden, loc. cit,
footnote 5, at pp. 454-457.
94 Supra, footnote 62. The decision is severely criticized in Gelowitz, loc. cit, footnote 5.
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The defendants made the argument that the plaintiff was, in effect,
a "wait and see" plaintiff. By not joining in the first action the plaintiff
had sought to assure its opportunity for two chances to succeed; if the
first action was successful, she would seek to rely on it, whereas if the
first action was not successful, she would have a second chance to succeed
by proceeding with this case. In declining to give effect to this submission
the court's response was draconian97
One cannot conclude that the ends of justice are best served by permitting such
a situation to prevail. If the plaintiffs in separate actions wish to stand on their
right to a separate trial where the facts and issues and defendants are identical with
another claim, they must take the chance of having their claim follow the result
in the first action. Similarly, the defendant liability must be taken as having been
established in the first action . To rule otherwise would be to permit an abuse of
process through the prospect of a multiplicity of actions, inconsistent results and
no fitting end to the litigation process .
Without referring to Bomac, a similar result was arrived at in the
Manitoba case of Bjarnarson v. Manitoba98 These two actions involved
claims against the Province of Manitoba for flooding farmland . In the
first action, one of two brothers sued and was successful in establishing
that the flooding resulted from the negligence of the province. Subsequently,
the second brother, who owned adjoining land, brought a similar action,
and the plaintiff was successful in his claim that the defendants were
precluded from relitigating the issue of liability . Hewak C.J.Q.B . at first
instance took the bull by the horns and reviewed extensively the American
and English authorities on mutuality . He noted that Carl Zeiss Stiftung
v. Raynor & Keeler Ltd (No. 2),99 clearly upheld the requirement of
mutuality and that issue estoppel would not apply in circumstances where
the party seeking to rely on the estoppel was not a party or a privy of
the party to the prior proceeding . After describing howin the United States
the requirement of mutuality had been criticised by the courts and by
legal scholars, and ultimately abandoned in Parklane, he adopted the
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court and of Lord Denning in
Mcllkenney;lw
I, for one, agree with both the direction and reasoning found in the decisions
of Lord Denning and the United States Supreme Court, and the principles there
applied . In my view, the law should be sensitive to current situations and alive
to the exigencies of today. While it must always strive to be certain and clear,
at the same time it should be flexible enough to encompass contemporary needs.
In these times of aviation or common carrier disasters, chemical waste spills, or
pharmaceutical accidents, when it is tragically quite common to have multiple litigants
with the same cause of action against the same defendant, and where determination
of a common issue impacts equally upon those litigants, the law as well as the
litigants would be well served by such a fair and sensible legal doctrine. A doctrine
97 Ibid, at pp . 27-28.
98 (1987), 21 C.P .C . (2d) 302 (Man.Q.B., C.A .) .
99 supra, footnote 52.
100 Supra, footnote 98, at p. 311.
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that would not only tend to bring a finality to at least a portion of the litigation,
but also would assist in protecting the litigants from the additional costs they otherwise
would incur if they were required to re-litigate issues already decided when the
only real issue remaining would be quantum of damage.
The Manitoba Court of Appeal, in a very short judgment,i°1 upheld
the decision of first instance, but on slightly different grounds. It observed
that Hewak C.J.s reliance on issue estoppel in the absence of mutuality
was inconsistent with the recent decision of the Court of Appeali02 that
mutuality ofparties is still a requirement for the application of issue estoppel.
ut it concluded that where a defendant has already been found negligent
and had a full and fair opportunity to contest that finding, it would be
an "abuse of process" to permit the defendant to dispute its negligence
again in a second action and the defendant was hence precluded on the
issue of liability .
In the final analysis, then, the Manitoba Court of Appeal upheld
offensive non-mutual issue estoppel by simply calling it abuse of process.
owever, a difficulty with the decision is that neither the judge at first
instance nor the Court of Appeal paid any attention to the "wait and
see" qualification in Parklane, yet on the facts of the case, it appears to
be a glaring case of a "wait and see" plaintiff. It is rather ironic, given
the sweeping breadth ofHewakC.,I .'sjudgment andhis reliance on Parklane,
that the United States Supreme Courtwould likely have arrived at a different
decision because of the "wait and see" problem.
In the subsequent case of Germscheid v. Valois,lo3 the Ontario High
Court gave affirmative preclusive efféct to an earlier judgment and also
directly confronted the "wait and see" problem. The case involved a fire
in a bunkhouse on a construction site. In an earlier action, one of the
injured workmen, P1, had successfully sued a number of defendants and
this decision had been affirmed on appeal. Subsequently, another injured
workman, P2, commenced a similar action and moved for summary
judgment on the issue of liability against those parties who were losing
defendants in the first action.
In holding that the losing defendants who were common to both
actions were to be precluded on the liability issue, the court observed
that Canadian courts have declined to abandon the requirement of
mutuality,lo4 but that they have arrived at the same conclusion by invoking
abuse ofprocess. It decided that on this ground the defendants wereprecluded
from relitigating the issue of negligence and hence liability. However, the
court directly confronted the fact that the plaintiff clearly had played "wait
101 Ibid, at p. 312.
102 Solomon v. Smith, supra, footnote 81 .
103 (1989), 34 C.P.C . (2d) 267 (Ont . H.C.) . An appeal was taken from this decision,
but the case was ultimately settled and the appeal abandoned.
104 Because of Angle v. Minister ofNational .Revenue, supra, footnote 10.
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and see" . The court rejected the Parklane solution (refusing to allow
estoppel), because to do so would open the risk of inconsistent decisions,
involve the squandering of judicial time and would do injustice to the
defendants who now supported the present plaintiff and had nothing to
do with that plaintiff's conduct. Instead, the court addressed the wait and
see problem by imposing cost sanctions with a two-fold purpose: to deter
other litigants from adopting unjustified or unexplained "wait and see"
tactics, and to indemnify the present defendants for the expenses they were
now incurring because the plaintiff failed to participate during the first
trial . The court ordered the plaintiff to pay the costs of all of the defendants
on the motion on a solicitor and client basis and, to carry through the
deterrent principle, it recommended that the trial judge should consider
a similar order at trial in relation to any matters that were duplicated
by reason of the failure of a plaintiff to have been involved in the first
trial.
While Canada lacks a landmark decision of an appellate court clearly
abandoning the mutuality requirement in favour of non-mutual issue
estoppel, the decisions in Solomon,IO 5 Bomaclo6 and Bjarnarsonl°7 spell
the death of mutuality, albeit under the unfortunate and confusing rubric
of "abuse of process". The next step is to abandonformally this terminology
and adopt non-mutual issue estoppel. In so doing Canadian courts must
address certain problems inherent in the doctrine and must reconcile the
evidentiary and estoppel usage of prior decisions . These matters are addressed
infra, in Part VI,I08 but before so doing, it is useful to give a summary
of recent experience in the United States with the doctrine .
V. "US.A . Today"
[Vol. 69
As we have seen, non-mutual preclusion against those who have already
litigated and lost has longbeen the general rule in the United States . However,
three aspects of the contemporary operation of the doctrine are worthy
of brief comment. First, the "toxic tort" cases have demonstrated that issue
estoppel is not a panacea for repetitive litigation. Second, there has been
a movement towards extending issue estoppel to permit its use against
non-parties. Third, the United States Supreme Court has exempted the
central government from the operation of non-mutual preclusion .
The United States is currently enduring what is considered by some
to be a nation-wide, mass-tort litigation crisis resulting from a staggering
volume of "toxic-tort" cases arising from defective drugs (for example,
Bendectin and DES) and various injury causing products (for example,
101 Supra, footnote 81 .
lob Supra, footnote 62 .
i°7 Supra, footnote 98 .




asbestos, Agent Orange and the Dalkon Shield 1.11.D .) .109 )Experience has
demonstrated that attaining the efficiency promised by non-mutual pre-
clusion in these cases is far more problematic than the courts that forged
the doctrine foresaw. The doctrine has been relatively easy to apply, and
has worked effectively in the context of mass accidents (for example, a
railroad or airplane crash) . Mass-accident litigation involves a single event
harming a limited number of claimants, simultaneously, at one location
(for example, a cruiseship food poisoning episode, a nightclub fire or a
hotel skywalk collapse). In such cases, usually a single issue-negligence-
is diapositive of liability and all relevant facts on this issue are identical
for all claimants and there is only one or few potentially liable defendants .
Non-mutual preclusion can be a potent device in avoiding repetitive litigation
with regard to mass-accidents, but it has proved to be largely unsuccessful
and of low utility in reducing repetitive litigation in the new mass tort
cases, the "toxic-torts". These cases typically exhibit quite different and
complicating factors, e.g., claimants are spread across the whole country;
many different defendant manufacturers maybe involved; facts are dissimilar
and liability depends upon proof of exposure (which will have occurred
at different times) and upon the manufacturer's knowledge at the time
of each claimant's exposure . These characteristics have rendered issue
estoppel impotent, primarily for reasons that are unrelated to non-mutuality.
The factors contributing to the inability of offensive issue estoppel
to fulfill its promise in the toxic-tort context has been graphically demon-
strated in asbestos litigation .'101n those cases the major problem has centered
around the number and extent of individual issues presented by suchlitigation
(for example, the ever litigatable questions of individual plaintiffs exposure
and sufficiency of exposure) and the difficulty of determining what was
decided in Action #1 (which is greatly complicated by the use of jury
trial) and whether the issues decided are identical to issues arising in Action
#2 .111 This inability of subsequent plaintiffs to satisfy the court of "identity
109 The extent of the problem and the inability of non-mutual preclusion to ease the
crisis is described in Ratliff, op. cit, footnote 11 ; L.S . Mullenix, Case Resolution of the
Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal Procedure Act (1985-86), 64 Texas L. Rev. 1039;
D.J . Gunn, The Offensive Use of Collateral Estoppel in Mass Tort Cases (1982), 52 Miss.
L.J. 765; M. Weinberger, Collateral Estoppel and the Mass-Produced Product: A Proposal
(1979-80), 15 NewEng. L. Rev. 1; K. Erlenbach, Offensive Collateral Estoppel and Products
Liability: Reasoning with the Unreasonable (1982-83), 14 St. Mary's L.J. 19 .
do See Green, loc. cit, footnote 40 ; Note, An Analysis ofthe Legal, Social and Political
Issues Raised by Asbestos Litigation (1983), 36 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 573, at pp. 659-689.
M The "same issue problem" is exacerbated by the fact that cases have been brought
in virtually every state and the laws governing the determination of liability differ. Moreover,
if the defendant's knowledge of potential harmful effects is relevant to liability, this gives
rise to questions of when the defendant had the requisite knowledge and whether the
plaintiffs exposure occurred at a time when the defendant had that knowledge. Since
a verdict rarely reveals with any precision the jury's findings, any overlap in the exposure
periods of plaintiffs, combined with uncertainty about the temporal scope of the first verdict,
creates an ambiguity that logically prevents the use of collateral estoppel.
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of issues" has understandably led to holdings that issue estoppel is
inapplicable. But this has created a further complicating factor. Numerous
subsequent actions have thus gone to trial, leading to inconsistent deter-
minations which in turn has led later courts to refuse to invoke non-mutual
preclusion on the grounds of unfairness . Other fairness considerations have
also played a role. Inconvenience of the forum and the (initially small)
amount at stake, the unavailability of evidence and witnesses, limited
procedural opportunities and any other factors suggesting that less than
a fair and thorough opportunity to demonstrate the merits of one's case
have dissuaded courts from making more than mildly effective use of the
doctrine as a means of streamlining asbestos litigation .
The inability of issue estoppel to assist in the resolution of these toxic-
tort cases (which are literally paralyzing some United States courts) has
led to numerous calls for the development ofother less private, less individual
litigation oriented mechanisms, to deal with this type of product liability
case, in particular class actions .' 12
Asecond contemporary development in the United States is the attempt
to expand collateral estoppel to include the estoppel ofnon-parties. 113 Such
an extension would permit a common defendant to use a judgment in
his or her favour against later plaintiffs who, since the demise of mutuality,
may use an unfavourable judgment against the common defendant .114 This
is seen by some as a way of solving the problem of the "wait and see"
onesidedness (the option effect) that offensive estoppel produces. By
permitting collateral estoppel of non-parties the option effect "would
disappear and mutuality, albeit of a different sort, would be restored".115
Recent decisions have stretched traditional doctrine and allowed issue
estoppel to be used against non-parties in various situations .Ilb Some cases
have manipulated the privity concept finding privity based on a variety
of relationships independent of litigation, for instance, between husband
and wife or defining privity to cover certain business or contractual
relationships .' 17 Other cases, going beyond privity, apply issue estoppel
to a non-party whoparticipated in a prior decision as a strategist or financier
112 See Ratliff, loc. cit, footnote 11 and Mullinex, loc. cit., footnote 109. See also,
D. Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means
(1986-87), 62 Ind. L.J . 561 . The National Law Journal, September 3, 1990, p. 3, reports
that three federaljudges, who together have 10,000 asbestos cases, are attempting to formulate
a national class action, but without success to date .
113 The following analysis is based on Motomura, loc. cit., footnote 37. See also,
Pielemeier, loc. cit., footnote 23, and Schroeder, loc. cit., footnote 23 . For an extensive,
critical account of the caselaw on estoppel of non-parties, see Wright, Miller and Cooper,
op. cit., footnote 5, paragraphs 4448-4462.
114 Motomura, loc. cit., footnote 37, at p. 1025 .
us kid





of the litigation . 118 The most radical departure from the rule against non-
party preclusion is found in a case relying on "virtual representation",
holding that a "non-party is bound if a party who had the same interest
litigated the prior case, even though the non-party was neither a participant
nor in privity with the party in the prior proceeding".' 19 These developments
reflect significant pressure for the expansion of issue estoppel to permit
non-party preclusion . Some commentators welcome the development, while
others view it with scepticism and alarm. Moreover, there are serious
constitutional and fairness concerns as to whether estoppel of non-parties
can meet the requirements of procedural due process in denying the
individual litiganthis or her day in court. However, this movement represents
a concerted effort to redress the imbalance of the option effect given to
plaintiffs by unqualified non-mutual issue estoppel . (In part VI suggestions
will be made as to how some of the benefit of non-party preclusion can
be achieved in a way that does not deprive the non-party of his or her
day in court) .12 o
The final recent development is the Supreme Court's holding, in United
States v. Mendoza,121 that non-mutual preclusion may not be invoked as
against the United Mates Government. The action was one of a string
of cases that followed an unappealed lower court ruling entitling a Filipino
veteran to be naturalized as an American citizen. The court gave several
reasons for its holding. The government is a party to a far greater number
of cases than any other litigant in the federal courts, its litigation often
involves issues ofgreat public importance and preclusion might often freeze
development of law with the first ruling. (A further consequence would
be that the court could not rely on its general practice of deferring review
until a number of courts of appeal had the opportunity to agree or disagree
on the issue) .
The court also asserted that the preclusion of government relitigation
wouldput an intolerable burden on the losing government agency (effectively
forcing it to appeal every adverse decision, whichwould substantially reduce
the government's flexibility in formulating litigation strategy) and would
defeat the object off preclusion by increasing litigation through appeals.
Finally, in what may be seen as the unnecessary politicalization of the
118 Ibid, at p. 1028 .
119 Ibid
120 Infra, p. 656 et seq.
121464 U.S. 154 (1984) . For critical analysis, see A.L. Levin and S.M. Leeson, Issue
Preclusion Against the United States Government (1984-85), 70 Iowa L. Rev. 113; Note:
Collateral Estoppel and Non-Acquiescence: Precluding Government Rèlitigation in the
Pursuit of Litigant Equality (1985-86), 99 Harv. L. Rev. 847. However, in the companion
case of United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 464 U.S. 165 (1984), the court held that
the doctrine of mutual defensive collateral estoppel is applicable against the government
to preclude relitigation of the same issue already litigated against the same party in another
case involving virtually identical facts.
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law, the court held that successive administrations may legitimately adopt
different views on issues of public law, and ought not to be controlled
by the preclusion consequences of judgments accepted by earlier
administrations.
VI. Problems andProposals
The foregoing discussion suggests two major problem areas that call for
further analysis and resolution . The first (arising primarily from the Canadian
case law) is the relationship between using prior judgments preclusively
as issue estoppel and using them evidentially as primafacie evidence subject
to rebuttal. The second problem is that embracing offensive non-mutual
issue estoppel can encourage potential plaintiffs to "wait and see" : to refrain
deliberately from participating in the first action (against a common
defendant) with a view to exercising an option subsequently, i.e., to invoke
issue estoppel if the defendant is found liable in action #1, or to disregard
the decision in that action if the defendant is vindicated and to proceed
to relitigate the issue of the defendant's liability.
A. The Role, if any, for Using Prior Judgments as "Prima Facie Evidence
Subject to Rebuttal"
We have seen two ways in which prior judgments have been used
in subsequent proceedings involving different parties-as truly preclusive
issue estoppel (which prevents re-litigation) and using the prior judgment
as prima facie evidence subject to rebuttal (which permits re-litigation,
but with the prior judgment being admitted in evidence in the second
litigation). If mutuality is abandoned, and non-mutual preclusion is adopted
subject to the qualifications already articulated, two questions arise : how
do these rules relate to one another and do we need both?122
These questions need to be addressed in two separate contexts . The
first is where preclusive effect is sought against aparty to the former litigation .
The second context is whether there is a role for using the prima facie
evidence approach as a modified form of non-party estoppel?
(1) Where Preclusive Effect is Sought Against a Party to the Former
Litigation
In the first context, reason dictates that if the conditions for non-
mutual preclusion are met, this "stronger" doctrine should apply leaving
no room for the prima facie evidence approach . If the dual components
of the doctrine, fairness and efficiency, are met, than issue estoppel should
122 In this context it is worth noting that Bentham proposed an evidentiary use of
the former judgment rather than preclusive use. "[T]hat, however, because [a judgment]
ought not to be made conclusive, it ought not to be admissible, is an inference which




apply and the former judgment should preclude relitigation.123 This has
certainly been the doctrinal development in the United Mates. As Professor
Motomura124 has described, historically in the United Mates, there were
various instances of the use ofpriorjudgments as evidence . Put as mutuality
was abandoned it ousted the weaker doctrine in those areas where the
evidentiary use of prior judgments was being used as a surrogate for non-
mutual issue estoppel (that is, the judgments were being used evidentially
against those who had been parties. to the prior proceeding). The logic
ofthis approach is persuasive. If the conditions for the application of non-
mutual preclusion are met, preclusive effect should be given to the prior
judgment rather than merely making it a matter of evidence .
ut accepting this general proposition still leaves circumstances where
it will be appropriate to use the evidentiary approach. This can be seen
by examining the Hollington v. Hewthorn type of scenario, that is, a prior
traffic conviction followed by a subsequent civil motor vehicle action. Here,
if we apply the tests necessary to determine whether non-mutual preclusion
should be available it will often lead to the conclusion that it is inapplicable .
First, frequently in such cases the "full and fair opportunity to defend"
test will not be metbecausegiven the nature of most traffic court proceedings
the now convicted person will often have lacked the incentive to litigate
fully the issue in the traffic court.125 Second, if we accept the notion that
123 Subject of course to the traditional and very narrow exceptions to the application
of issue estoppel, that is, if it can be shown that the previous decision was obtained by
fraud or collusion, or if it can be shown that since the previous decision new evidence
has come to light (which could not have been ascertained before by reasonable diligence)
and which entirely changes the aspect of the case : Phosphate Sewage Co. Ltd v. Molleson
(1879), 4 App. Cas. 801, at p. 814 (H.L .) . These exceptions are discussed in Mcllkenney
v. ChiefConstable ofthe West Midlands, supra, footnote 17, at pp . 319 (Q.B.), 237 (All
P.R.), and in Hunter v. Chief Constable of West Midlands, supra, footnote 55, at pp. 545
(A.C .), 736 (All E.R .) . Recently it has been held that if fresh material or new developments
in the law show that an issue has been wrongly decided either in fact or law, the court
will allow the issue to be reopened in subsequent proceedings between the parties if this
is necessary to work justice between the parties : Arnold v . National Westminster Bank
plc (1990), 140 New L.J . 129 (C.A.).
124 Loc. cit, footnote 37 .
125 See, H.C . Karlson, Criminal Judgments as ProofofCivil Liability (1982), 31 Defense
L.J. 173, at p. 192, pointing out that "[u]nless a defendant is aware that the outcome
of the traffic court proceeding will create a substantial risk of civil liability, he usually
has little incentive to contest the issue of guilt. Minor fines imposed by traffic courts create
no desire on the part of a defendant to expend the funds necessary to obtain an attorney
and litigate the issues. A driver may plead guilty to a minor traffic offense because the
cost of defending outweighs the burden of having such a conviction on his record". The
author points out that the majority of jurisdictions in the United States refuse to permit
minor traffic convictions to preclude relitigation of issues in a civil action for these reasons
and in such cases, the conviction is used as evidence only . A similar point with regard
to lack of incentive is made in the Law Reform Committee, 15th Report (The Rule in
Hollington v. llewthorn) (Cmnd. 3391, 1967), para. 13. In the United States a guilty
plea is not a basis for issue estoppel because the issue was not "actually litigated", but
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the driving force behind non-mutual preclusion is judicial efficiency and
that it should not apply where efficiencies are minimal or non-existent,
then there may be a further reason for not applying preclusion in the
subsequent civil negligence action . Often in such cases, issues other than
the liability of the convicted person are present (for example, the plaintiffs
contributory negligence and the comparative negligence ofother defendants)
so that all the evidence relating to the accident has to be adduced (including
the evidence relating to the convicted person's negligence). The end result
is that there may be no efficiency gains and, moreover, giving preclusive
effect to the conviction may actually complicate the second adjudication . 126
If, however, in any given circumstances it is inappropriate to give
preclusive effect to a prior judgment, resort may still be had to admitting
the prior judgment as prima facie evidence subject to rebuttal, since the
fairness rights of all persons affected are protected by their ability to call
evidence to rebut the prima facie evidence arising from the earlier
judgment.127Butin some cases involving the use ofprior criminal convictions
in subsequent civil actions, non-mutual preclusion will be quite appropriate,
for example, after a fully contested rape trial where the accused was
vigorously represented and faced a substantial period of imprisonment,
andwasconvicted. If the convicted person is subsequently sued for damages
for assault, a court should normally conclude that such an accused had
the plea may (as an admission) be treated as conclusive in some states, or as evidence
against the party in a subsequent action : see Restatement, op. cit., footnote 5, para. 27,
comment (e) .
A further argument for not giving preclusive effect to traffic convictions, involving
both fairness and efficiency, is that often the real party in interest in the subsequent civil
action will be an insurance company, which will not have participated in the criminal
defence of the insured . From an efficiency point of view, the last thing we want to do
is to have insurance companies defending every traffic prosecution against their insured
on the off chance that there may subsequently be a civil negligence claim.
126 In the United States, for both of the reasons given in the text, prior judgments
of guilt or civil liability may not be given preclusive effect in such cases; Restatement
(2nd) of Judgments, paragraph 29(6), comment (h) (1982) . These concerns also formed
part of the reasoning in Hollington itself. The point is made in the Law Reform Committee
Report, op. cit., footnote 125, para. 23 .
hi See, Hunter v. ChiefConstable ofthe West Midlands, supra, footnote 55, at pp . 544
(A.C .), 735 (All E.R.). For further justification of using prior decisions as prima facie
evidence where non-mutual preclusion is inappropriate, see text, infra, at footnote 134.
Questions obviously remain as to how effectively a court, particularly where there
is a jury, can balance the previous conviction against any rebuttal evidence. This matter
is analyzed in some depth by Motomura, loc. cit., footnote 37, at pp . 1037-1051, concluding
that on balance a properly instructed jury should be able to give appropriate weight to
the prior adjudication and any rebuttal evidence. Fairness considerations will also come
into play where mere evidentiary use is to be made of a prior decision, although they
are far less pressing than when preclusive effect is to be given . On this issue, see the
sensitive approach taken by Coo J. in Catty v. James, supra, footnote 90.
Herman and Hayden, loc. cit, footnote 5, at pp. 459-467, are sharply critical of




a full and fair opportunity to defend.128 The conditions for non-mutual
preclusion will have been metand issue estoppel should apply to theexclusion
of giving the previous conviction effect as prima facie evidence subject
to rebuttal.129
This analysis gives rise to a further question . Where non-mutual
preclusion is appropriate, should it be applied even in the face of a statute
such as the United Kingdom Civil Evidence Act, section 11,130 providing
for the mere use of the prior criminal conviction as prima facie evidence?
(This issue may obviously arise in the United Kingdom ifthe courts abandon
mutuality and adopt offensive issue estoppel in a non-criminal conviction
context, that is, in the mass accident situation) . If mutuality is openly
abandoned it really undercuts the predicate to section 11, which is that
issue estoppel is limited to the same parties . ®n this question, the United
States experience with its anti-trust legislation is illustrative . Legislation
predatingthe abandonmentofmutualityprovided that where the government
had brought a successful anti-trust criminal or civil action, then in any
subsequent civil action against the violators by a private plaintiff, the prior
adjudication could be used as primafacie evidence. After the abandonment
of mutuality the issue arose as to whether such prior adjudications could
be used as collateral estoppel . Some courts concluded that the legislative
rule pre-empted general collateral estoppel rules in anti-trust cases, but
other courts and commentators took the view that the evidentiary effect
under the legislation was a minimum standard only, and that collateral
estoppel should be available whenever general doctrine permitted.131
Ultimately Congress responded by amending the legislation to permit
collateral estoppel against defendants who were common to both actions .132
(2) Where Preclusive Effect is Sought Against Non-Parties to the Former
Litigation
is there a role for the use of a prior judgment as "primafacie evidence"
as a modified form of non-party estoppel?133 Non-mutual preclusion permits
128 This will also be true of some traffic convictions, for example, for impaired driving,
where there was a vigorous defence. I am not suggesting a separate rule for trafficconvictions
and other convictions (but see, supra, footnote 125, as to the role of insurance) . In all
cases a functional analysis is required.
129 See Karlson, loc. cit, footnote 125, and contrast Q. v. Minto Management, supra,
footnote 87 (use as evidence only) .
130 Supra, footnote 78 .
131 Motomura, loc. cit, footnote 37, at pp. 991-994.
132lhid See the Clayton Act, para . 16(a) (1982) . Canada has a similar provision
to the former Clayton Act section permitting prima facie evidentiary use of previous
convictions in subsequent civil proceedings against the accused: see the Competition Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34 (as amended) s. 36(2).
133The recent American experience with precluding non-parties is discussed, supra,
the text at footnote 113.
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estoppel only against persons who were parties to the original proceeding:
it does not permit preclusion against non-parties to the initial adjudication .
To do so would simply be to deprive such persons of their "day in court"
and due process. But while this caveat is logical and necessary it gives
rise to two problems . It is the very source of the "option effect" in offensive
non-mutual issue estoppel and it is "inefficient" in the sense that it "wastes"
the results of the first adjudication even where that adjudication was
extensive, thorough andappears sound. Using priorjudgments in subsequent
litigation as prima facie evidence against persons who were not parties
to the initial adjudication seems a reasonable and quite defensible "half-
wayhouse" that can aid in resolving both these problems . There is respectable
precedent both in statutes and caselaw for such an approach. The English
Civil Evidence Act, section 11134 makes prior convictions admissible
evidence in any proceeding, not just a proceeding to which the accused
is a party. Common law precedent is to be found in United States patent
law135 and in Canadian caselaw . 136
This intermediate ground of using prior judgments as prima facie
evidence against non-parties is an acceptable response to the problem of
how to use the results of prior adjudications as against non-parties . It avoids
wasting the prior judgment, thus aiding efficiency, while at the same time
protecting the rights of non-parties to their day in court. They are still
free to call any evidence they choose to rebut the earlier judgment.137
134 Supra, footnote 78.
135 In patent validity litigation a patentee cannot use a prior finding of patent validity
to preclude a different alleged infringer, who was not a party to the prior proceeding,
from contesting the validity of the patent. With non-mutual preclusion unavailable the
only alternative to disregarding completely findings of validity is to admit them into evidence
and the United States courts have consistently done so . The purpose is to relieve a patent
holder of the expense and uncertainty of re-establishing validity from scratch whenever
the patent is challenged . See, Motomura, loc. cit, footnote 37, at pp. 999-1001 . To achieve
the same objective the United Kingdom Patents Act 1977 adopts a different approach .
"In order to prevent a patentee from being put repeatedly to the expense of defending
successive attacks on the validity of his patents, s . 65 provides that a court may, in any
proceeding, certify that the validity of claim was contested in those proceedings and when
this is done, if in any subsequent proceeding for infringement or for revocation of the
patent, the patentee is successful, he is entitled to costs as between solicitor and client
unless the court orders otherwise" : T. Terell, in D. Falconer, W. Aldous and D. Young
(eds .), The Law of Patents (12th ed., 1971), para . 972. See also, C.I.B.A., Guide to the
Patents Act 1977 (2d ed ., 1984), p. 318.
136Q. v. Minto Management Limited, supra, footnote 87 (evidentiary use of conviction
against convicted person's employer), but contrast with Claiborne Industries Ltd v. National
Bank of Canada, supra, footnote 87.
137 See Hunter v. ChiefConstable ofthe WestMidlands, supra, footnote 55 . Motomura,
loc. cit., footnote 37, at pp . 1032-1036 argues in favour of using judgments as evidence
in lieu of non-party preclusion and analyzes the issue in considerable depth. He also, at





(3) Others Areas-Administrative Determinations and Cases Involving
Government
Another area where evidentiary use of a prior judgment, rather than
preclusive use, seems preferable is with regard to the use by courts of
prior decisions arrived at by administrative tribunals.138 1n many instances
giving non-mutual preclusive effect to administrative determinations in
judicial proceedings will be inappropriate on general principles, since very
frequently the procedural differences139 between the two settings will simply
make it unfair to give preclusive effect to the administrative determination . 140
1f in embracing non-mutual preclusion Canadian courts adopt the
United States Supreme Court's approach in United States v. Mendoza141
and refuse to permit the doctrine to be used against the government, this
would be another area in which it would be appropriate to allow a prior
decision to be used as prima facie evidence . That there may be a need
to so qualify non-mutual preclusion is illustrated by the decision in LeBar
v. Canada,1 42 where non-mutual issue estoppel was applied against the
government of Canada in circumstances that suggest there may be some
wisdom in the Mendoza exception . In that case, in Action #1 the court
had enunciated a method of calculating the term of imprisonment to be
served by inmates before their release. This formula was not followed
with regard to LeBar's release and he successfully brought an action for
damages for unlawful imprisonment. The court held that the Crown was
precluded from re-litigating the issue as to the proper calculation of release
dates, rejecting an argument that issue estoppel did not apply because the
decision relied upon by the plaintiff was inconsistent with another decision
on the same issue involving the Crown. The court took the view that
138 In the Canadian . context there may be a constitutional problem with superior courts
accepting as binding the determination of a tribunal that is not a court, under s . 96 of
the Constitution Act, 1867 . On the general question ofthe impact of s. 96 on thejurisdiction
of courts and administrative tribunals, see P. Ilogg, Constitutional Laws of Canada (2nd
ed ., 1985), pp . 150-164.1 am indebted to Mr. Eric Certner for raising this issue. Australian
cases have refused to give estoppel effect to the findings of nonjudicial administrative
tribunals in subsequent court proceedings; see, R. v. Gough; Ex parte Municipal Officers'
Association (1975), 133 C.L.R. 59 (H.C. Aust.); Australian Transport Officers Federation
v. State Public Serpices Federation (1981), 34 A.L.R. 406 (F.C.A.).
139Which is further reinforced by the fact that, typically, no appeal to a court is
available from tribunals and the only method of review is limited judicial review.
140Where this is so it would seem appropriate to use the administrative determination
as prima facie evidence subject to rebuttal. See, R.R . Perschbacher, Rethinking Collateral
Estoppel : Limiting the Preclusive Effect of Administrative Determinations in Judicial
Proceedings (1983), 35 U. of Florida L. Rev. 422, persuasively making this argument
and advocating mere evidentiary use of administrative determinations. In Spataro v. Handler,
supra, footnote 88, the - court appears to have permitted the evidentiary use of a prior
administrative determination.
141 Supra, footnote 121 .
142 Supra, footnote 80.
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it was the duty of the Crown to have appealed one or both of the earlier
decisions, and in the absence of such appeal the government was precluded
by the case relied upon by the plaintiff. The decision in LeBar,I43 and
the facts and outcome of the case, suggest that there may be a need within
the Canadian context, at least with constitutional and public law decisions,
to give the Crown relief from the effects of non-mutual issue estoppel
for some of the reasons put forward in Mendoza. (For example, to avoid
pressure on the Supreme Court of Canada to either grant leave to appeal
in all cases or expose the government to issue estoppel if leave is refused) .t 44
B. The "Wait and See" Problem: Disarming the Option Effect
As the United States Supreme Court in Parklane recognized, the
offensive use of non-mutual issue estoppel carries with it the problem that
potential plaintiffs may play "wait and see" . Unless the rules as to the
applicability of the doctrine take this into account, the unmodified use
of the doctrine encourages "wait and see" and hence duplicative litigation .
By staying out of Action #1, P2 escapes being bound by a decision adverse
to the plaintiffin Action #1, but if P 1 is successful in that action in establishing
the defendant's liability, the subsequent plaintiffcan use issue estoppel against
the common defendant in Action #2. Professor Ratliff has observed that
this "option effect" is part and parcel of the doctrine .I45 In Parklanel46
the court acknowledged what Professor Currie had earlier identified as
this "multiple claimant anomaly",147 and proposed as part of the doctrine
that preclusion should be denied "in cases where a plaintiff could easily
have joined in the earlier action". Experience has indicated that for two
reasons the Supreme Court's qualification of the doctrine is ineffective.
143 See also, Emnis v. The Queen, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1148, at pp. 1160-1162, (1979),
102 D.L.R. (3d) 193, at pp . 200-202 (per Pigeon J.) . The traditional view in Commonwealth
countries is that the Crown is bound by resjudicala; see, P. Hogg, Liability of the Crown
(2nd ed., 1989), pp . 191-192. However, it must be kept in mind that such doctrine was
developed within the context of mutuality which requires that the parties to both litigations
be the same.
144 A number of colleagues who have read this article in manuscript were dubious
about this suggestion . However, I believe it must be taken seriously. In a regime of non-
mutuality, without such an exception, an unappealed decision against the government on
an issue by even a trial court (e.g., that the Income Tax Act is unconstitutional) can
lead to preclusion . Requiring the federal government to appeal every decision or face
permanent preclusion would likely to be unfair to (the original) individual litigants and,
given that the federal government has more cases before the court than any other litigant,
will lead to further court congestion and inefficiency. One policy underlying non-mutuality
is to avoid the common defendant abusing subsequent plaintiffs, and the court, by attempting
to relitigate the issue already decided without good reason. In the case of the government
there are various pressures to act responsibly (publicity, Parliament, elections) that are
absent in the private sector and hence there is not the same need to discipline the government
as a litigant as there is with private sector litigants.
145 Ratliff, loc. cit., footnote 11 .
146 Supra, footnote 23, at pp . 330-331 .




First, the sanction that follows (the plaintiff in Action #2 may not rely
on issue estoppel and hence must reprove the claim) is an insufficient
deterrent, since- it puts the plaintiff . in no worse a position than he would
have been in Action #1 (of having to prove his claim), but he is still
ahead because he escapes the risk of an adverse decision in Action #1
and he may have learned a great deal-in terms of proving his claim-
from "observing" the earlier litigation . (Moreover, where P2 is permitted
to obtain preclusive effect from the decision in action #1, he or she escapes
the cost of establishing liability) . 148 Second, the United Mates caselaw
indicates that, in any event, the courts have been extremely slow to impose
even the suggested sanction and have generally declined to do so . 149
Where does this leave us? Does offensive non-mutual issue estoppel
ultimately have to be rejected because of an "incurable" option effect?
I suggest not . Instead, what is necessary are strategies to avoid the problem .
These fall into two categories-"second case strategies" to discourage
litigants from holding back, and "first case strategies" designed to marshall
together in the first action all related claims against a common defendant
to bring about one common determination. Both approaches involve
adopting a policy perspective that to maximize judicial efficiency and to
remove the unfairness of the option effect, the legal system should generally
require that like and related claims should be subject to only one
adjudication .150
"Second case strategies" are rules to be imposed in case #2 to discourage
P2 from holding back from participating in case #1. There is a range
of them which can be used individually or collectively. The first is a
strengthening of the Parklane qualification : P2 must satisfy the court in
the second action that he or she has a "cast iron" reason for not having
joined in action #1. Desire to sue alone, rather than with others, should
be an insufficient excuse. The test should be: if P2 was aware of action
#1 and joinder or consolidation would have been permitted had P2 sued
at the time of action #l, then he or she should be treated as a wait and
148 Avoiding the cost of establishing liability, and thus obtaining a free-ride financially,
seems to have been overlooked or underrated in the literature as a reason for l'2 to stay
out of the first action. See, infra, for a suggestion of using orders redistributing costs to
remove this incentive.
149 Ratliff, loc. cit, footnote 11, at p. 86, states that "in fact, of some 40 odd cases
specifically citing Parklane's `could have joined' language, only 5 have used that standard
to disqualify option holders". He analyzes the caselaw and concludes that "these holdings
indicate that courts are likely to disqualify wait-and-see plaintiffs only in the most egregious
cases" . The courts' self-interest in having to allocate resources to retry the issue already
decided and their interest in avoiding the embarrassment of inconsistent determinations,
are likely at least a partial explanation for the courts' unwillingness to take a "tough"
line with wait-and-see plaintiffs.
150 For a useful general discussion, see J.C . McCord, A Single Package for Multi-
Party Disputes (1975-76), 28 Stan . L. Rev. 707. For an early articulation of some of
the suggestions made here, see Semmel, loc. cit, footnote 5.
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see plaintiff.151 Second, the defendant's conduct should be taken into account.
If at the time of action #1 action #2 was pending and the defendant did
not request consolidation (where it would have been granted), then P2
should be entitled to rely on issue estoppe1 .I 52 In such circumstances the
"option effect" is not unfair, it is of the defendant's own making .I 53
The next issue is what consequences should follow from P2 being
declared to be an improper wait and see plaintiff? The Parklane sanction
(the plaintiff cannot rely on issue estoppel and must prove his case) is
obviously inadequate . Two possibilities present themselves and both have
been suggested in Canadian cases. The first, and less draconian, is to use
the Anglo-Canadian device ofgeneral cost indemnity (fee shifting) to punish
and discourage the wait and see plaintiff, that is, by ordering the plaintiff
to pay the defendant's costs in action #2 on a solicitor and client basis,I 54
or, requiring the plaintiff to bear part of the costs incurred in the first
action-an action the plaintiff should have joined in and the benefit of
which the plaintiff now seeks to reap .I 55 A second, draconian sanction
is that proposed in Bomac Construction Limited v. Stevenson I56-that a
true "wait and see" plaintiff should be held to be bound by any adverse
decision in the first action . (While this is certainly an extreme position
it is not to be mistaken as simply unthinking, non-party issue estoppel .
Rather, it is based upon P2's own "abuse of process": under the policy
perspective adopted here, there is an obligation on P2 to join in the earlier
litigation and the sanction for not so doing is that P2 is bound by any
adverse decision in that action, that is, P2 is bound by the earlier adverse
151 Compare the A.L .I . proposal, infra, footnote 166, providing for court notification
to non-parties and primafacie preclusion whether or not they participate . In federal states
such as the United States and Canada problems are produced by the fact that potential
plaintiffs are sometimes spread over various states and provinces and it may be unfair
to require plaintiffs to travel to an inconvenient forum at the risk of being declared a
"wait and see" plaintiff with the sanctions envisaged in the text . Perhaps the way to deal
with this problem is through "first case strategies" providing a national forum for such
cases. See infra, footnote 167.
152 This notion could be further extended by requiring defendants, who at the time
of the first litigation are aware of claimants who have not yet sued, to take third party
proceedings to determine their liability, if any, to the non-suing claimants. Modern rules
of court now often permit third party proceedings to be used as such a general joinder
device .
153 See Bragg v. Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd, supra,
footnote 2, and the Restatement, op. cit., footnote 5.
154 See Germscheid v. Valois, supra, footnote 103.
155 For a precedent (in a different context) that those receiving benefits from a suit
should be required to help pay its expenses ("the common benefit theory"), see Mills
v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S . 375 (1970). See also J. McCamus, The Self-Serving
Intermeddler and the Law of Restitution (1978), 16 Osg. Hall L.J . 517, at pp . 559 et
seq. ; J.P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients : Attorney Fees from Funds (1973-
74), 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1597; J.P . Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public
Interest Litigation (1974-75), 88 Harv. L. Rev. 849.




decision not simply because it was made, but because F2 was under a
duty to have participated in the first action and did not) .
An alternative approach is to call in aid the device of using the former
judgment as "prima facie evidence subject to rebuttal" . Not only is this
strategy less draconian than the Bomac solution, it is potentially more
powerful. A drawback to the "should have joined or consolidated" rule
is that it is ineffective as against plaintiffs who cannot be shown to be
improper "wait and see" plaintiffs, because they did not have knowledge
of the earlier proceeding. Obviously in such circumstances, the argument
for doing anything is much weaker since such plaintiffs are not, by definition,
exercising any "option effect" . However, even with respect to such plaintiffs
there is respectable, precedent for making some fair usage of the prior
adjudication, thus maximizing judicial efficiency. 157 Where such usage is
made of the prior determination as against an improper "wait and see"
plaintiff, it should be effective in discouraging wait and see tactics . If a
plaintiff realizes that an adverse decision in action #1 will become prima
facie evidence subject to rebuttal in action #2, the plaintiff will presumably
think very carefully before abstaining from participation in the first action
where the prima facie adjudication will be made.
"First case strategies" are not adjudicative rules, rather they are case
management techniques designed to marshall together multiple claimant
cases with a view to bringing about (if settlement does not occur)158 a
common or "test case" adjudication to which can then be attached the
type of estoppel effects already discussed . The second case strategies will
go a long way towards achieving this . But rather than leaving matters
to the parties, the court system should take the initiative, through "managerial
judging",159 especially in mass disaster cases where there will be multiple
claimants .
Case-tracking systems can be put in place requiring all litigants and
lawyers on the filing of the initial documents (either claim or defence)
to indicate to the court whether there are presently pending related claims
or whether there are likely to be so . in the future .160 The court should
be given the power, on its own motion where necessary, to consolidate
such actions and to devise one or more test actions, insuring typicality
of facts and adequate representation by lead counsel, 161 with provision
157 See, supra, the text at footnote 134.
lss Resnik, op. cit, footnote 8, notes that a very high percentage of cases consolidated
in the United States through the Multi-District Litigation Panel are disposed of during
the pre-trial process (usually by settlement) and never reach trial .
159 See J. Resnik. Managerial Judges (1982-83), 96.IIarv. L. Rev. 374, for a critical
account of such practices . For a contrary view, see S. Flanders, Blind Umpires-A Response
to Professor Resnik (1983-84), 35 Hast . L.J . 505; E.D . Elliott, Managerial Judges and
the Evolution of Procedure (1986), 53 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 306.
160 See, for example, T.M . Mengler, Gathering Related Litigation in Illinois (1988-
89), 20 Loyola U.L.J. 937.
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being made for those parties not having carriage of the claim or defence
in the test case to contribute to the cost thereof. (Steps in these directions
have already been taken in Canadian litigation).I62 The court should also
be given power to direct advertising as to the existence of the litigation
and inviting potential claimants to join in the litigation . Taken together,
these proposals move in the direction of creating a court centred, rather
than a private litigant centred, class or group action and represent a move
towards making at least mass disaster litigation a public commodity rather
than a private commodity. For most Commonwealth jurisdictions that lack
an effective class action mechanism, this will be an improvement.I 63
161 On both of these matters there is a wealth of experience in the United States
in class actions . See, for example, Mullinex, loc. cit., footnote 109, at p. 1083 . On questions
of representations, see, for example, B.G. Garth, Conflict and Dissent in Class Actions:
A Suggested Perspective (1982-83), 77 Nw. U.L. Rev. 492.
162 In Whiteoak Lincoln Mercury Sales Ltd v. Canadian Pacific Ltd (1982), 30 C.P.C.
136 (Ont . H.C .), it was ordered that 398 actions, brought by more than 900 plaintiffs,
arising out of a train derailment (involving noxious chemicals and which led to a large
urban area being evacuated for several days) be tried together. Five categories of claims
were established as to each of which there was a "scheduled plaintiff' who would have
primary carriage of the actions; production and discovery were to take place only between
the scheduled plaintiffs and the defendants ; non-scheduled plaintiffs were not required to
take any steps until the issues of liability and entitlement to recovery for categories of
damages had been resolved in the actions of which the scheduled plaintiffs had carriage.
Thus plaintiffs were given the option not to appear at trial, "in the confidence that all
issues of liability will be disposed of in the test cases that emerge". However, "clients
electing to await the outcome of liability should not enjoy a free ride . Some modest
contribution to the costs of lead counsel may be provided in the discretion of the trial
judge". The judge commented that the order he made "may not satisfy all parties but
it does, in my view, represent the desire of all counsel to create a workable system out
of chaos". As a precursor to the order in the Whiteoak litigation, the court had earlier
made an order staying many of the related actions: Canada Systems Group (Est.) v. Allendale
Mutual Insurance Co. (1983), 33 C.P.C . 210 (Ont . Div. Ct.). For a contrary American
view, see R.H. Transgrud, JoinderAlternatives in Mass Tort Litigation (1984-85), 70 Cornell
L. Rev. 779 (although more efficient adjudication of liability issues in mass tort cases
would be desirable, it is improper to seek this end through consolidation or common
question class actions leading to the joint trial of the issues common to the related claims,
as it affects adversely the traditional right of tort litigants to control the individual prosecution
of their liability claims).
The type of consolidating orders and case management techniques employed in
Whiteoak, achieved much ofwhatis suggested in the text. The court's approach was facilitated
by the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 37.15 permitting the assignment of a single
judge of all pre-trial motions in complicated cases or numerous cases involving the same
issues. Similar techniques are being currently employed in Ontario in the litigation arising
out of the Air India disaster over the Irish sea.
163 On the limited scope for class actions in Commonwealth law, see W.A . Bogart,
Questioning Litigation's Role-Courts and Class Actions in Canada (1986-87), 62 Ind.
L.J. 665; K. Uff, Class, Representative and Shareholders' Derivative Actions in English
Law (1986), 5 Civ. Just . Q. 50 . In Canada, at present, a viable class action procedure
exists only in Quebec. This may be about to change with the introduction of a class





Such a move-towards the "aggregation" of litigation-is emerging
in Canada. As Judith Resnik has documented,164 in the United States it
has already emerged not only through class actions, but more significantly
through the device of the multi-district litigation pane1, 165 and recent
proposals by the American Law Institute's Complex Litigation project166
would take this trend towards nation-wide aggregation of litigation even
further. However, in providing means for the aggregation of claims initiated
in different regions of the country, the Americans are far ahead of Canada,
whichcould create real difficulties when faced with nation-Wide litigation .167
The direction in which the English, and certainly the Canadian, law has
developed vindicates Lord Denning's approach in Mcllkenney168 favouring
non-mutual issue estoppel over abuse of process. Our desire to prevent
duplicative litigation involving one common party is based simply on the
fact that the same issue has been previously determined against the_ common
Conclusion
164Op. cit., footnote 8. The phenomenon is, however, primarily motivated by the
need of the courts to process efficiently related claims, rather than to counter specifically
the "option effect". Resnik observes that while class actions have frequently been a source
of controversy in the United States, court-centred aggregation of litigation has been well
received and has experienced little opposition . See also R.D . Freer, Avoiding Duplicative
Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy and the Court's Role in Defining the Litigation
Unit (1989), 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 809; S. Yeazell, Collective Litigation as Collective Action
(1989), U. 111 . L. Rev. 44; R. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions
of Ideal Law Suit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules (1989), 89 Col.
U.L . Rev. 1; R. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigation Forms: Reconceiving the History
of Representation (1990), 70 B.U.L. Rev. 213.
165 The multi-district litigation statute, 28 U.S .C ., para. 1407(a), permits a single judge
to preside during the pre-trial phase in consolidated cases pendingin federal courts throughout
the United States.
166 The A.L.I. Complex Litigation Project, Tentative Draft No. 1 (April 14, 1989),
and Tentative Draft No . 2 (April 6, 1990), enthusiastically endorses aggregation through
consolidation and proposes statutes providing for both federal intersystem consolidation
and federal-state intersystem consolidation, a Complex Litigation Panel with authority to
promulgatenation-wide rules, expresspowers in transferee courts to enjoin relatedproceedings
in stateorfederalcourt, to notify non-parties ofthe pendency ofanaction (invitingintervention
and providing prima facie for preclusion whether or not they intervene) and to choose
what substantive law to apply: Resnik, op. cit, footnote 8.
167 In Canada constitutional limitations on the jurisdiction of the national trial court-
the Federal Court of Canada-prevent it from handling disputes between the subject and
subject: see 3. Evans and B. Slattery, Case Comment (1989), 68 Can. Bar Rev. 817, for
an analysis of the case law. This will prevent that court from playing the central, national
role taken by the federal courts in the United States : see Resnik, op. cit, footnote 8. How
then in Canada will we deal with a nation-wide litigation? In the Air India litigation
(supra, footnote 162), multiple claimshave been filedin both Quebec and Ontario. Presently,
by agreement, the Quebec actions have been stayed and the Quebec plaintiffs are in fact
"participating" in the Ontariolitigationby being represented at various pre-trialand settlement
conferences .
168 Supra, footnote 55.
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party by an earlier court, and does not turn on any additional factors
or behaviour requiring the invocation of "abuse of process" . What we
are seeking to do is to prevent relitigation, in such circumstances, by the
application ofan estoppel arising from an earlierjudgment. As Lord Denning
pointed out, this is the province of the doctrine of issue estoppel, liberated
from the requirement of the same parties and mutuality. Attempting to
deal with the problem by using the vague concept of abuse of process
adds nothing, except confusion, and it should not be used given that we
already have a doctrine-issue estoppel-specifically designed to deal with
the problem. Moreover, replacing abuse of process with non-mutual issue
estoppel locates the solution within the appropriate doctrinal and policy
context. This is important in itself and has the added advantage of exposing
us to the experience of United States courts with this doctrine .
Courts have likely been attracted to the discretionary doctrine ofabuse
of process because of the (quite accurate) perception that, in this area,
discretion is important to ensure that preclusion does not operate unfairly .
But discretion is also an essential part of the doctrine of non-mutual issue
estoppel. That rule replaces a general requirement of mutuality, subject
to exceptions (i e., for privies), with a general principle of non-mutuality,
subject to discretionary exceptions (e.g., fairness) . Adopting non-mutual
issue estoppel does not lock courts into a rigid rule. Indeed, quite the
contrary. It is a rule whose overall thrust is clear, but with alarge discretionary
element .
Courts should abandon abuse of process, and the requirement of
mutuality, in favour of non-mutual preclusion . However, in adopting this
approach, particular care must be taken to ensure that its underlying policies,
fairness andjudicial efficiency, are fulfilled. In particular, the "option effect"
inherent in offensive non-mutual preclusion must be disarmed and this
maybe done through "second case strategies" designed to force or encourage
all claimants to'assert their claims in the first action. Ideally, in mass disasters
cases the courts should invoke consolidation and case management tech-
niques to bring about typical test case adjudications which will resolve
all consolidated claims, or will provide a solid basis for non-mutual
preclusion . Further, the courts should permit the use ofjudgments as "prima
facie evidence subject to rebuttal" when non-mutual preclusion is inap-
plicable. Such usage avoids the prior adjudication being wasted, while at
the same time protecting the parties' right to fairness, since they are still
free to call evidence to rebut the prima facie evidence.
